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"MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL...-:
ASSESSING THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER
11TH
Steven W. Becker*
Behavior is a mirror in which every one shows his image.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Modern American law has come a long way since the time when
outbreak of war made every enemy national an outlaw .... "2
Unfortunately, the sentiment expressed by these words, which were
penned by United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson more
than fifty years ago, has not been heeded by those conducting the
present "war on terrorism." Instead, Arabs and Muslims have been
subjected to mass detentions and, regardless of their American
citizenship, have been targeted for harassment and unwarranted
suspicion on the basis of physical appearance, religious persuasion, and
association. In addition, the measures implemented in the aftermath of
September 11th have gone far beyond their declared purpose of fighting
terrorism. Not surprisingly, such measures have dramatically increased
the power and intrusiveness of the federal government while
concomitantly infringing upon the fundamental freedoms of the
American people.
These policies, which violate both international and domestic law,
represent a victory of politics over law. Yet, if the aggressive nature of
such measures is not quickly curtailed, they could have a detrimental
impact upon our national policy and a dangerous, long-term effect on
the safety of American citizens, in particular.
For example, our present treatment of foreign prisoners of war
("POWs") will surely have serious consequences if American POWs fall

Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago,
Illinois; Senior Fellow, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University
College of Law, Chicago, Illinois. I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, DePaul University College of Law, without whom this
Article would not have been written.
1
HoY's NEW CYCLOPEDIA OF PRACTICAL QUOTATIONS 493 (Kate Louise Roberts ed.,
1940) (quoting JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, DIE WAHLVERWANDTSCHAFTEN II. 5).
2
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1950).
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into the hands of a foreign power. Similarly, our double standards in the
treatment of Arab and Muslim Americans is bound to have a like impact
upon the way U.S. citizens are dealt with by populations in other
countries.
Also, significantly, our unyielding support for Israeli
terrorism against the Palestinians, while at the same time undertaking a
worldwide "crusade" against Muslim terrorism, 3 will only lead to
increased terrorist attacks against the United States, either on our own
soil or against our citizens and installations abroad.
Therefore, an objective assessment of the strengths and failings of
our present policies, absent the red, white, and blue sheen given to such
measures by their purveyors, is required.
II.

DISCUSSION

A. The Spirit of America
The mirror held up to America's national tragedy in the immediate
wake of September 11th reflected strength, courage, generosity, and
hope among the ruins of the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The
selflessness of so many on that terrible day and in the days that followed
became living metaphors of the American spirit of generosity and
4
determination.
America's generosity is not limited to such spontaneous gestures at
times of national crisis, although that is when it is more evident.5 It
recurs daily in countless unheralded deeds, involving people from all
walks of life, whose helping hand reaches millions at home and abroad.
Although the national disaster of September 11th was
unprecedented, the open heart was not new. The United States
sacrificed much to defend Europe in two world wars and then to rebuild

3
See Peter Ford, Europe Cringes at Bush "Crusade" Against Terrorists, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 19, 2001, at 12 ("President Bush's reference to a 'crusade' against terrorism,
which passed almost unnoticed by Americans, rang alarm bells in Europe. It raised fears
that the terrorist attacks could spark a 'clash of civilizations' between Christians and
Muslims, sowing fresh winds of hatred and mistrust."), available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2001/0919/p12s2-woeu.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
4
See Joshua B. Freeman, Working-Class Heroes, in A JUST RESPONSE: THE NATION ON
TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 91 (Katrina vanden Heuvel ed., 2002);
The Spirit of America, NEWSWEEK (Commemorative Issue, Fall 2001).
5
Jeff Giles, The Nation's Neighborhood, in The Spirit ofAmerica, supra note 4, at 40.
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it, as well as Japan, after WWII. 6 Since then, this nation has given billions
of dollars in foreign aid and non-governmental charitable contributions
and sent thousands of volunteers through the Peace Corps and other
organizations to help people all over the globe. No nation in history has
proven so giving and without the expectation of return.
The mirror held up to the national tragedy in the weeks following
the tragic attack on New York and Washington reflected the Nation's
tolerance, in spite of the harm suffered and the fear that spread.
Americans from all ethnic and religious backgrounds stood in solidarity
7
with Arab and Muslim Americans against the backlash of prejudice.
President Bush led the Nation in encouraging religious leaders and their
congregations to stand with their Muslim brothers and sisters in an
outpouring of the religious solidarity that is at the heart of America's
covenant of freedom.8
But no nation, this one included, is immune from excesses and errors
in policy and judgments. A nation as big and complex as this one
necessarily lacks cohesiveness and coherence in its policies and actions at
home and abroad. 9 This is the inherent weakness of a young, dynamic,

6

See JAMES BACQUE, CRIMES AND MERCIES:

THE FATE OF GERMAN CIVILIANS UNDER

ALUED OCCUPATION, 1944-1950, at 142-82 (1997) (documenting Herbert Hoover's heroic
efforts to feed the starving civilian population of post-World War II Germany); DOUGLAS
MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 269, 324 (1964); FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER, GENERAL
SOLDIER-STATESMAN 295 (1951) ("The magnificent record of
DOUGLAS MAcARTHUR:

General MacArthur in the rebuilding of Japan from its ruins has never been surpassed in
world statesmanship.").
7
See September 11 2001: Continuing Religious Reflections, at http://pewforum.org/
issues/display.php?IssueID=5 (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) ("Religious communities and
leaders have ... extended their arms to Muslim Americans, holding community meetings
between local churches and mosques, even as most Americans struggle to gather
information and an understanding about Islam.").
8
Id. (describing President Bush's September 20, 2001, meeting with leaders from
diverse religious groups prior to his address at the Washington National Cathedral for the
"National Day of Prayer and Remembrance"); see Remarks by President Bush at Islamic
Center of Washington, D.C., 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1327 (Sept. 17, 2001).
9
A good example of this lack of consistency is the Administration's vacillating position
on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban and al-Qa'&da detainees.
Initially, President Bush determined that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply to
these prisoners; then, after sharp criticism from Europe and a request for reconsideration
from Secretary of State Colin Powell, the President announced that said Convention was
applicable to the Taliban troops but not to the al-Qa' da fighters. See Sean D. Murphy,
Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INTL L. 461,
476-78 (2002). For a detailed discussion of the international legal issues surrounding the
status of the detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, see infra Part ILD.
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and diverse society governed by a democratic system fraught with the
dangers of political and economic compromises. The election cycle and
its costs, the influence of interest groups, the public's indifference, and
10
the power of the media and influences exercised over it
all contribute to
the making of a very relative democracy. This explains why the historic
commitment to upholding certain legal values has waned. Other factors
explain the hegemonistic policies and practices of the United States that
so offend others." But the nation that was once built on the foundation
of certain principles, with a purposeful sense of national values and of
national interest, is no longer.
B.

The Afghan War

No one ever doubted that the U.S. military would prevail over the
Taliban, yet the war that began in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, was
presented to the American people by the Administration's public
relations campaign as a great epic.1 2 The impression created was that we
were up against a formidable foe, requiring so much of our military
resources. 13
Whether that government-created perception was
objectively or subjectively needed to engender public support for that
war is ultimately a matter of political judgment. Some feel that
Americans on the whole are too politically immature to understand the
meaning of national interest and too selfish to accept sacrifices in its
name unless absolutely necessary.

10

See John R. MacArthur, Unleash the Press, in A JUST RESPONSE:

THE NATION ON

TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supra note 4, at 201. For a discussion of

media access and war news, see infra Part II.C.
11 See Fareed Zakaria, Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at 22; see also
Michael Scott Doran, Somebody Else's Civil War: Ideology, Rage, and the Assault on America, in
HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR 31 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon

Rose eds., 2001); cf.Hiroshima Mayor Says U.S. Is Misguided, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2002, at 10
(quoting Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba's recent remark that "It]he United States
government has no right to force Pax Americana on the rest of us, or to unilaterally
determine the fate of the world").
12
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1347, 1349 (Sept. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter Response Address] ("Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy
campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.").
13
Id. at 1348 ("There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They
are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places
like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror.").
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Thus, political handlers feel compelled to package foreign policy
issues and sell them as they do marketable products.1 4 The war in
Afghanistan and the so-called "war against terrorism" were handled in
that manner. 15 The facts and the issues, before, during, and after the end
of the war in Afghanistan, have been concealed, altered, or
manipulated. 16 The American public received only that information
which was needed to marshal political support for the Administration's
17
foreign and domestic agenda.
During the war we dropped 1.2 million tons of bombs on that
mountainous country, which had already been devastated by almost
18
twenty years of war and was devoid of any meaningful infrastructure.
The main reason was to avoid using U.S. ground troops and to prevent
casualties. Such concern, however, did not only stem from the laudable
purpose of saving American lives but because of the perceived national
phobia of returning body bags. The long shadow of the Vietnam War
still looms large over the Nation, though more so over politicians than
most other people.19 The Bush Administration remembers how eighteen
casualties in Somalia caused the Clinton Administration to pull out some
20,000 troops from that troubled country. 20 For the world's only super-

See Michael Massing, Uncle Ben Goes to War, in A JUST RESPONSE: THE NATION ON
TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supra note 4, at 205, 205-07; Stephen J.
Hedges, U.S. Pays PR Guru to Make Its Points, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2002, at 1C.
15
Hedges, supra note 14 ("The Rendon Group's current Pentagon work is just one part
of a multifront, multimedia assault the Bush administration is waging against terrorism.
While propaganda, war and presidents have always gone together, the Bush White House
is especially attuned to the public relations side of military conflict.").
16
See MacArthur, supra note 10, at 201-02; Liz Sly, U.S. Grabs at Shadows in Hunt for Al
Qaeda, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2002, at 1 ("It is a war being fought largely in the shadows, mostly
out of the glare of media scrutiny ....");Patrick Martin, CNN Tells Reporters: No
Propaganda, Except American (Nov. 6, 2001), at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/
nov2001/cnn-n06.shtml (last visited Jan. 18,2003); cf. JOHN R. MACARTHUR, SECOND FRONT:
14

CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN THE GULF WAR (1992).
17

Martin, supranote 16.
In an extraordinary directive to its staff, Cable News Network has
instructed reporters and anchormen to tailor coverage of the US war
against Afghanistan to downplay the toll of death and destruction
caused by American bombing, for fear that such coverage will
undermine popular support for the US military effort.

Id.
18

Cf.Milton Bearden, Graveyard of Empires: Afghanistan's Treacherous Peaks, in HOW DID

THIS HAPPEN?: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note 11, at 83, 85-93.
19 MacArthur, supra note 10, at 202-03.

See Ralph Begleiter & Carl Rochelle, Officials Fear Callfor Pullout if U.S. Soldiers Die in
Bosnia (Dec. 21, 1995), at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/dec95/1220
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power to have such a phobia of military casualties does not do honor to
this country's military and underestimates the American public's ability
to judge where national sacrifice is needed and where it is not.
But, as a result of this political phobia, the U.S. military inflicts
disproportionate harm on the enemy, including impermissible harm to
civilians and civilian installations 21 -a practice which has now turned
into an accepted military doctrine, even though it may violate
international humanitarian law. 22
In addition, the very recent discovery of mass graves at Dasht-e-Leili
raises further concerns as to the U.S. commitment to enforcing such
humanitarian standards. 23 According to a confidential United Nations
memorandum, these graves contain the bodies of almost 1000 Taliban
POWs who were asphyxiated in container trucks during transport to the
Northern Alliance's prison at Sheberghan. 24 Whether U.S. forces were
aware of these practices is still being debated. 25

21/pm/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2003) (referring to President Clinton's
announcement of "the U.S. pullout from Somalia after 18 troops were killed in a firefight
and a [sic] the body of an American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu").
21
Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2002, at 1 ("The American air campaign in Afghanistan, based on high-tech, out-ofharm's way strategy, has produced a pattern of mistakes that have killed hundreds of
Afghan civilians.").
[Tihe evidence suggests that many civilians have been killed by air
strikes hitting precisely the target they were aimed at. The civilians
died, the evidence suggests, because they were made targets by
mistake, or because in eagerness to kill Qaeda and Taliban fighters,
Americans did not carefully differentiate between civilians and
military targets.
Field workers with Global Exchange, an American organization
that has sent survey teams into Afghan villages, say they have
compiled a list of 812 Afghan civilians who were killed by American
airstrikes.
Id. Cf.Rocket Reportedly Misses U.S. Forces, CHI.TRIB., May 12, 2002, at 3C (describing deaths
and maimings caused by land mine accidents in Afghanistan).
22 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 51(5), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
23 See Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., The Death Convoy of Afghanistan, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26,
2002, at 20, 22.
24
Id.; Report: UN Memo Called for Probe into Taliban POW Deaths, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19,
2002, at 4.
25 Dehghanpisheh et al., supra note 23, at 29-30.
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C. Media Access and the War News
The Pentagon provided daily military briefings and Secretary
Rumsfeld offered his candid but not always forthright views. 26 The
Pentagon, however, almost always prevented media access to the facts in
order to conceal what is euphemistically referred to as "collateral
damage" to civilians and civilian property. 27 By controlling access to the
field and by managing the news, the Pentagon controlled the
information that the Americans received. 28 In addition, almost no
opposing or even disagreeing views were expressed in the media. 29 The
exclusive emphasis of the media's coverage was on the patriotic support
for the war.
Because the Pentagon controlled access to Afghanistan, no one could
assess the extent of the "collateral damage." The number of civilians
killed and injured, whether in the hundreds or in the thousands, and the
30
extent of the damage to their meager property remains unknown.
31
Also, refugee estimates caused by the war, though seldom publicized,
were at two million, and no one knows how many starved or died from
disease and the cold of a bitter winter. 32 No known humanitarian

26
27
28

MacArthur, supra note 10, at 201.
Martin, supra note 16.
See Bruce Shapiro, Information Lockdown, in A JUST RESPONSE:

THE NATION ON

TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supranote 4, at 89, 90 ("At the Pentagon,

news has been reduced to a trickle far more constricted than anything during Kosovo,
which in turn was more restricted than during the Gulf War.").
2
See, e.g., Victor Navasky, Profiles in Cowardice, in A JuST RESPONSE: THE NATION ON
TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supra note 4, at 81, 81.

Bill Maher got into trouble on Politically Incorrect when he correctly
observed in the aftermath of September 11 that it's wrong to call the
suicide bombers "cowards" and impolitically added, "We have been
the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away: That's
cowardly. Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say what
you want about it, it's not cowardly."
Two advertisers, Sears and Federal Express, pulled their ads,
seventeen stations canceled his program and Maher apologized for
being, well, politically incorrect.
Id.
30

Cf. Filkins, supra note 21.
Cf. U.S. Committee for Refugees' Country Report: Afghanistan (2002) ("It was difficult to
estimate with any accuracy the number of Afghans who were internally displaced
primarily because of conflict, but the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) believed the
figure to be about 1 million at year's end."), http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/
scasia/afghanistan.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
32 See Jonathan Schell, Seven Million at Risk, in A JUST RESPONSE: THE NATION ON
TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supra note 4, at 21-23.
31
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assistance was provided to the refugees by the military during the war,
presumably because air force resources were needed for the total war
effort. The early humanitarian campaign that was launched with much
publicity was limited to some food drops and was short lived. One of its
tragedies was that the yellow plastic-wrapped food drops were confused
by the hapless recipients with the yellow-painted cluster bombs which
killed and maimed some of the starving refugees, most of which were
children. 33 No one knows how many died or were injured, but the
The food
United States provided no known medical assistance.
packages' color was, however, subsequently changed. 34
The media was compliant with Pentagon-imposed restrictions and
seldom critical. 35 The more cooperative networks and reporters were
rewarded with guided field visits and the opportunity to take pictures of
Tora Bora caves. 36 Those who asked Secretary Rumsfeld sharp questions
found themselves cut out of valuable information, which in the end
The media's
proved to be nothing more than minor details. 37
manipulation was effective, resulting in the public's loss of information,
particularly timely information.
This was the approach followed when the United States invaded
Panama. It was not until six months later, when the news was stale, that
it was reported that some 2400 civilians were killed. 38 Since then, the
issue has not been revisited, and no one knows precisely how many
civilians were killed by the United States in that invasion as "collateral
damage." The same is true with the Afghan war, as no one knows the
facts, and, if they are ever known, by then no one will care. One of the

33 Thalif Deen, 'Bombs for Fathers, Bread for Children' Under Attack, ASIA TIMES ONLINE
(Nov. 13, 2001), at http://www.atimes. com/c-asia/CK10Ag01.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2002).
34

Id.

3
Martin, supra note 16.
36 See Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda's Mule Trail to Pakistan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20,
2001, at 1 (recounting reporter's tour of the Tora Bora caves).
37
See Michael Massing, Press Watch: October 10, 2001, in A JUST RESPONSE: THE NATION
ON TERRORISM, DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supra note 4, at 192.
38 See Hal Hinson, Movies: Canal Knowledge, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1992, at D7 (noting that
the Panama invasion, "which was played up by the media as a smashing success, was not
nearly as tidy and efficient as we were led to believe, with perhaps thousands of
Panamanian civilians killed, many of them murdered by American troops and shoveled
into mass graves").
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casualties suffered by this country is the valued right to know and to
39
make political and other informed judgments on the basis of the facts.
D. POW Treatment
The fate of some 300 men detained in Guant~namo Bay, Cuba,
believed to be fighters from al-Qa 'da and the Taliban, has been decided
not on the basis of the Geneva Conventions, but on the basis of a U.S.
political decision of doubtful legality. 40 The main question is whether
these detainees should have been granted POW status, as required by
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.41 The legal rights of combatants
include: (i) the right to attack military objectives (e.g., armed forces
personnel, bases, and equipment) 42 and (ii) the right not to be prosecuted
for legitimate military actions (e.g., taking up arms against other
combatants).43 Combatants are entitled to POW status, which means that
the prisoners have to be released when the conflict ends. 44 This is, in
part, why the Administration argues that the Taliban soldiers are not
POWs, so that they do not have to be released after the conflict in
Afghanistan ends. 45 But probably more important is that under the
Geneva Conventions, POWs are only required to give name, rank, serial
number (if it exists), and date of birth.46 This would have defeated the

39 See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 90 ("So comprehensive is the shutdown [of information]
that on October 13, [2001,] presidents of twenty major journalists' organizations declared in
a joint statement that 'these restrictions pose dangers to American democracy and prevent
American citizens from obtaining the information they need.'").
40
See White House Fact Sheet on Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html
(last
visited
Jan. 29, 2003); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 475-80.
41 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
42

See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 114 (1st ed. 1906) ("Such objects

[of land warfare] are chiefly the members of the armed forces of the enemy, but likewise,
although in a lesser degree, other enemy persons; further, private and public property,
fortresses, and roads.").
43 Id. at 263 (noting that, in contrast to those individuals who commit war crimes,
soldiers who commit hostile acts in the course of normal warfare "do not lose their
privilege of being treated as members of armed forces who have done no wrong").
44 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 118 ("Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
45 Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 353 (2002) (" [T]he denial of POW status brings with it far
more serious and relevant deprivations, including such vital protections as exemption from
punishment for lawful acts of war, repatriation at the conclusion of hostilities, and
internationally defined fair trial rights.").
46 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 17.
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purpose of U.S. interrogation, and that is why it was argued that they
47
were not POWs.
Although this position is legally erroneous and demonstrates the
Administration's lack of sensitivity to the international rule of law, it is
placing U.S. military personnel abroad in danger, as we have troops in
many parts of the world, and it is reasonable to assume that at some time
some of them may be captured. 48 If the same treatment is applied to
them, we would be hard put to argue otherwise. Also, significantly, the
double standard that we apply to "us" and to "them" has been one of the
49
main reasons why so many in the world oppose our actions.
50
The Third Geneva Convention governs the treatment of POWs.
Article 4(A) of the Convention grants POW status to "[miembers of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces." 51 If a question arises
as to the status of such combatants, it is to be determined by a judicial
process affording due process of law.5 2 Furthermore, if any combatant is
believed to have violated the law of armed conflict, they can be tried
before a judicial body affording them due process of law. 53 Whether this

47 Id. "No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Id.
48 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337,
340 (2002). Koh states that the Administration's policy
seriously disserves the long-term interests of the United States-whose
nonuniformed intelligence and military personnel will conduct
extensive armed activities abroad in the months ahead -to assert that
any captive who can be labeled an "unlawful combatant" should be
denied prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conventions, and
hence subjected to trial for "war crimes" before military commissions.
Id.
49 See David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
POL'Y Q. 9, 12-13 (Summer 2002).
To declare that Americans can fight enemies with the latitude of
warriors, but if the enemies fight back they are not warriors but
criminals, amounts to a kind of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose
international morality in which whatever it takes to reduce American
risk, no matter what the cost to others, turns out to be justified.
Id.
50 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41.
51 Id. art. 4(A)(1).
52

Id. art. 5.

93

Id. art. 84.
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process was afforded to the GuantAnamo Bay prisoners is presently
unknown. 54 The U.S. approach was driven by the effort to obtain
55
intelligence information from these prisoners.
The Taliban soldiers are regular combatants and are part of the
armed forces of that regime.
They are covered by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 as lawful combatants irrespective of whether the
conflict is characterized as that of an international or a noninternational
character.5 6 The civilians in Afghanistan are also covered by the Fourth
Geneva Convention, irrespective of whether the conflict is characterized
as that of an international or a noninternational character,57 but the
presence of U.S. and other foreign forces against the then-constituted
government of Afghanistan makes it a conflict of an international
character. 58 In that case, in addition to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,

A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless
the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil
courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in
respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the
prisoner of war.
In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a
court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and, in
particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the
rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105.
Id.
54
See Douglass W. Cassel Jr., No Courts for Guantanamo, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 5,
2002, at 5.
Hundreds of men captured late last year in Afghanistan are about to
begin their ninth month under American military guard at
Guantanamo Bay, with no end in sight. They are locked up on the sayso of our military, based on secret intelligence. They are denied access
to families, lawyers, courts of law or even military tribunals. Although
at least some protest their innocence, their stories are kept from public
view. Their liberty is entirely at the mercy of their military captors.
Id.
55 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
56 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 2 (" [T]he present Convention shall apply
to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.").
57 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
5
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 349 ("The POW policy suggests that an undeclared
international armed conflict existed at some point between the United States and the
Taliban.").

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 8

574

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37

Protocol I of 1977 applies. 59 It has been ratified by 161 states but not by
60
the United States.
Even if the conflict were to be classified as a conflict of a
noninternational character, Article 3 ("Common Article 3"), which is
common to all four Geneva Conventions of 194961 and Protocol II of
1977,62 establishes equivalent protection to lawful combatants of militias
and insurgent groups in conflicts of a noninternational character. 63 The
Geneva Conventions of 1949 differ from Protocol II of 1977 as to the
conditions whereby such combatants qualify for POW status. Under the
1949 Conventions, the four conditions are that the combatants: (1) wear
a distinctive emblem or insignia; (2) carry their arms in the open; (3) are
commanded by superior officers; and (4) are willing to obey the laws of
armed conflict.64 Protocol II requires only that the last two conditions be
66
met.65 It has been ratified by 152 countries but not by the United States.
67
One hundred eighty-nine countries have ratified the 1949 conventions.
Even under the terms of the 1949 Conventions, the Taliban forces carried
their arms in the open, and, if not their dress, surely the combination of
headgear and beards made them identifiable.( 8 They were also

5
Protocol I, supranote 22.
60 See International Humanitarian Law, State Parties & Signatories: by Treaty, at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView&Start=52.1.97&Count=150&Expand
=52.1#52.1 (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
61 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 3,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supranote 57, art. 3.
62 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol 1I].
6
Id. art. 1(1).
6
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 4(A)(2)(a)-(d).
6
Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 1(1) (providing that armed forces or other organized
groups must be "under responsible command" and "exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol").
66 See International Humanitarian Law, Protocol II:
States and Signatories, at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView&Start=53.1.84&Count=150&Expand
=53.1#53.1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
67 See International Humanitarian Law, 1949 Conventions: States and Signatories, at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?OpenView&Start=43.1.106&Count=150&
Expand=43.1#43.1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) [hereinafter 1949 Conventions].
68 See Thom Shanker & Katherine Q. Seelye, Who is a Prisonerof War? You Could Look it
Up. Maybe., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at 9 (citing opinion of M. Cherif Bassiouni).
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commanded by superior officers. Whether they were willing to abide by
the laws of armed conflict is something that would have to be
determined. 69 But Afghanistan did ratify the 1949 Conventions 70 and is
bound by them, and thus is also able to benefit from their protections.
Taliban combatants are, therefore, entitled to POW status. Additionally,
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits the procedures carried
out by the United States, as the Convention requires that they be given a
fair trial with a proper defense (including the right to counsel) 71 and the
right to be treated humanely, 72 which excludes any form of physical or
psychological torture. 73 Irrespective of whether the conflict is deemed of

69 Contrary to the position taken by the Bush Administration, some scholars assert that
once a group of combatants, such as the Taliban forces, qualify under Article 4(A)(1) of the
Third Geneva Convention as "[miembers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict,"
such groups need not satisfy the four conditions enumerated in Article 4(A)(2) in order to
qualify as prisoners of war:
If you are a member of the armed forces of a country or even a
government that is not recognized by the U.S. but is the de facto
government, then you are a P.O.W., without regard to requirements
for an insignia, etcetera. Those rules apply only to certain kinds of
nongovernmental armed forces and there are additional rules to apply
to people who don't fall under the umbrella.
Shanker & Seelye, supra note 68 (quoting Professor Douglass Cassel, director of the Center
for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law).
Furthermore, even if the Taliban fighters failed to qualify as POWs under either
subsections (1) or (2) of Article 4(A), they would still qualify under subsection (3), which
provides POW status for "[members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power." Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 41, art. 4(A)(3); see Adam Roberts, The Prisoner Question, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at B1.
70
Afghanistan became a State Party on September 26, 1956. See 1949 Conventions, supra
note 67.
71
Third Geneva Convention, supranote 41, arts. 84, 99, 105.
72

Id. art. 13.

Id. art. 99; see Murphy, supra note 9, at 475. Murphy explained the situation:
Photographs of the initial prisoners arriving at the Camp X-Ray
showed them kneeling on the ground, manacled, wearing blue surgical
masks, ear cups, and large blackened goggles-which the United
States asserted to be necessary security precautions during transport.
The prisoners were then held in cells with concrete floors, chain-link
fence walls, and corrugated metal roofs, kept fully lit at night.
Concern that the prisoners were not being treated in accordance with
international standards led to criticisms from foreign governments,
nongovernmental human rights organizations, and the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights.
Murphy, supra note 9, at 475. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret
Transfer of Terror Suspects (Mar. 11, 2002), at http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/03.25C.
Secret.Transfer.p.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
73
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an international or non-international character, mistreatment of POWs is
a war crime. 74 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I refer to
them as "grave breaches." 75
The 1949 Geneva Conventions anticipated such disagreements on
the interpretation and application of its provisions. Consequently,
Article 5 of the Third Convention of 1949 dictates that
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of [that] Convention until such time as their
76
status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
The situation with al-Qa'da fighters is different. If some of these
men are found to be fighting along side the Taliban forces and are part of
a regularly constituted unit satisfying the conditions stated above, they
too are entitled to POW status.77 But this does not mean that they cannot
be tried for previous crimes where federal criminal jurisdiction would be

Since Sept. 11, the U.S. government has secretly transported dozens of
people suspected of links to terrorists to countries other than the
United States, bypassing extradition procedures and legal formalities,
according to Western diplomats and intelligence sources. The suspects
have been taken to countries, including Egypt and Jordan, whose
intelligence services have close ties to the CIA and where they can be
subjected to interrogation tactics- including torture and threats to
families -that are illegal in the United States, the sources said. In some
cases, U.S. intelligence agents remain closely involved in the
interrogation, the sources said.
Id. See also Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to ProsecuteIndividuals Accused
of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. IN'L L. 320, 325 (2002) (remarking that "hooding the detainees,
even temporarily, might violate the 1984 Torture Convention"); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
74 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 85(5) ("Without prejudice to the application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as
war crimes."); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 130.
75 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 85; First Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 50;
Second Geneva Convention, supra note 61, art. 51; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41,
art. 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 57, art. 147.
76 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 5.
7
See id. art. 4(A)(2); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 353 ("Members of militias and
organized resistance movements may be POWs, under defined circumstances. Thus, some
Al Qaeda suspects captured during fighting in Afghanistan may also be entitled to
prescriptive POW status.") (footnote omitted).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss2/8

Becker: "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . ": Assessing the Aftermath of

2003]

Mirror,Mirroron the Wall

577

applicable. 78 On the other hand, if al-Qa'da fighters committed crimes
against U.S. military personnel during the conflict in Afghanistan, they
can be tried by a military commission in the field, as can Taliban
combatants who have committed such crimes against U.S. or allied
military personnel during that conflict.79 Any crimes committed by
Taliban combatants or al-Qa' da fighters prior to the commencement of
military operations in that country are either subject to Afghanistan
criminal jurisdiction 8 or, if the crimes were committed against the
81
United States, pursuant to federal criminal jurisdiction.
Members of al-Qa'?da can be charged with crimes against the United
States, including conspiracy, if it can be shown that those individuals
were indeed part of a conspiracy or were engaged in any act that
constituted a crime against the laws of the United States. 82 In that case,
they can be tried under U.S. federal law. The venue can be changed so
that they would not have to be tried in Manhattan or in Virginia.
Perhaps it is also possible to argue that al-Qa' da fighters are
members of an insurgent group that is engaging in a conflict of a

78 See Michael J. Matheson, U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several Options, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 354, 355 (2002) ("U.S. courts have jurisdiction over several offenses that appear to
have been committed by Al Qaeda or Taliban personnel.").
79 Id. at 358 ("[Tlhe use of U.S. military commissions can be a lawful and appropriate
option in some circumstances .... The best example might be the trial of persons who have
committed violations of the law of armed conflict on the battlefield in Afghanistan but have
no provable connection to the September 11 attacks.").
8
Id. at 357 (noting advantages of trial in a foreign court "since Al Qaeda and Taliban
personnel captured in Afghanistan are likely to have committed a wide variety of offenses
under Afghan law that could be easier to prove and less politically problematic").
81 See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
82
See Matheson, supra note 78, at 355-56.
Zacarias Moussaoui has been charged with violating various federal
antiterrorism statutes in connection with the September 11 attacks, as
well as conspiracy to murder U.S. employees and to destroy
property.... John Walker Lindh has been charged with conspiracy to
murder U.S. nationals, providing material support and services to
foreign terrorist organizations, engaging in prohibited transactions
with the Taliban, and carrying firearms during crimes of violence.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455A (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 11,
2001); see also United States v. Walker Lindh, No. 02-37a (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 15, 2002). Lindh
subsequently pled guilty to two counts that alleged he aided the Taliban and carried
explosives. Larry Margasak, Lindh Pleads Guilty in Deal to Spare Him from Life in Prison, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., July 15, 2002, at 3; see Juliette Kayyem, Prosecuting Terrorists, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., July 16, 2002, at 5 ("The Justice Department's willingness to settle the Lindh case can
only be understood as reflecting its own worry that, even in [federal court in Virginia], the
evidence prosecutors collected did not justify the specifics in the indictment.").

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 8

578

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol.37

noninternational character against the United States. 83 In that case, the
insurgent group is bound by Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and their attacks upon U.S. targets and U.S.
civilians constitute war crimes (as an alternative to considering those acts
as crimes against federal or state criminal laws)., 4 Article 2(1) of Protocol
II, however, has since clarified the definition of "armed conflict" as
contained in Common Article 385 to exclude "isolated and sporadic acts
of violence." 86 As the almost simultaneous assault upon the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon seems to fit squarely within this
exclusion, it is reasonable to conclude that "[tjhe September 11 attacks
did not launch an internal armed conflict within the United States, as
87
understood by international humanitarian law."
In short, the intellectual dishonesty of the Administration's position,
vis-A-vis the detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, is predicated upon the
government's attempt to selectively utilize elements from two distinct
constructs, the criminal justice system and the military model, by
applying the most advantageous portions of each when it is expedient to
do so:
The U.S. has simply chosen the bits of the law model
and the bits of the war model that are most convenient
for American interests, and ignored the rest. The model
abolishes the rights of potential enemies (and their
innocent shields) by fiat-not for reasons of moral or
legal principle, but solely because the U.S. does not want
them to have rights. The more rights they have, the
more risk they pose. But Americans' urgent desire to
minimize our risks doesn't make other people's rights
disappear. Calling our policy a War on Terrorism
88
obscures this point.

83 Cf. Michel Veuthey, Non-International Armed Conflicts and Guerilla Warfare, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMEs 243, 251 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986) (quoting
the conclusion of the 1962 Commission of Experts that "the existence of an armed conflict,
within the meaning of Article 3, cannot be denied if the hostile action, directed against a
legal government, is of collective character and consists of a minimum amount of
organization").
84 Cf.Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 57, art. 147.
85 See Veuthey, supra note 83, at 251.
86 Protocol II, supra note 62, art..1(2); see Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 348.
87 Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 348.
8 Luban, supranote 49, at 12.
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In harmony with the war model, the detainees are deprived of the
basic rights afforded to criminal defendants, such as the presumption of
innocence, the right to counsel, and the right to a prompt hearing. 89 In
line with the legal model, however, the detainees are designated as
"unlawful combatants" and are thereby deprived of POW status. 90 This,
in turn, subjects them to severe penal sanctions when, instead, they
should be entitled to combat immunity. 91 In addition, rather than being
eligible for immediate release at the cessation of hostilities,92 they are
93
subject to indefinite detention.
Generally, terrorist acts do not transgress the laws of war.94
Moreover, the United States has traditionally prosecuted international
terrorists in civilian criminal courts. 95 Yet, to apply the laws of war to
groups such as al-Qa'da could lead, in the case of the September 11th
attacks, to anomalous results:
The administration seeks to avoid constitutional and
international legal constraints upon the treatment of Al
Qaeda captives, and to fight a "war" with essentially no
rules. Al Qaeda captives are suspected of past or future
terrorist crimes, not violations of the laws of war, and no
legal basis exists to detain or try them as "unlawful
combatants."
If a new paradigm is being suggested, significant
and undesirable implications may result. Characterizing
the struggle to eradicate Al Qaeda as an international
armed conflict should logically make U.S. military
installations legitimate targets for Al Qaeda, using

89

Id. at 10.

90

Id.
Id. at 9-10.

91

92 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 118.
93 Luban, supra note 49, at 11; see Christopher Newton, Judge: No Rights for Detainees:
Taliban, al-Qaida Suspects Can Be Held Indefinitely, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at 26.
A federal judge ruled ... that suspected Taliban and al-Qaida
fighters held in Cuba do not have a right to U.S. court hearings,
allowing the military to hold them indefinitely without filing charges.
The 600 men held at ... Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are not in the
United States and thus do not fall under federal court jurisdiction, U.S.
District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly said.
Id.
94 Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 346.
95 Id.
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lawful methods of warfare. The result would be to
decriminalize violent conduct that can now be treated as
96
terrorist or common crimes.
In sum, the government's attempt to "have its cake and eat it too"
has not only caused much confusion and consternation 97 among both
domestic 98 and international bodies 99 but, more importantly, has placed
the members of our own military at risk of receiving like illegal
treatment in the event of their capture during future engagements.
E.

The PresidentialOrder EstablishingSpecial Military Commissions

On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order
regarding the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism," which authorized the establishment of
special military commissions to try, inter alia, those persons alleged to be
responsible for the attacks of September 11th.1°° Although the Order was

Id. at 348-49 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, War on Terrorism Brings Some Odd Legal Twists, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., June 25, 2002, at 2 ("In one of the strange turns in the war on terrorism, two
Americans are being held in military brigs without access to lawyers, while two foreigners
accused of terrorist activities are being tried in federal court with the full range of
protections usually accorded to Americans."); Lynn Sweet, Detaining Padilla: Legal Debate
on His Rights Opens, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 12, 2002, at 7; Laurence H. Tribe, Citizens and
Combatants, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 19, 2002, at 6.
98
See David Rennie, US Acting Like Star Chamber, Says Judge, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 15, 2002, at 16.
A judge has compared the Bush administration's actions over the
detention of an alleged Taliban fighter with those of medieval
monarchs.
Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was in custody at the Guantanamo Bay
naval base in Cuba, was transferred to a military prison in Virginia
after he told authorities he was born in America. He has been held
incommunicado ever since.
The government has ruled that Hamdi has no right to see a
lawyer, but Robert Doumar, a US district judge, said he could find no
precedent "of any kind in any court" for the decision, and compared
the government's behaviour to monarchs laying down the law through
the secret hearings of the Star Chamber.
Hamdi, 21, has been declared an "enemy combatant" with neither
the rights of a US citizen nor those of a foreign prisoner of war. But the
government refused to release evidence supporting the description.
Id.
99
See Murphy, supra note 9, at 475.
100 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Military Order].
96
9
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purportedly designed to ensure that accused noncitizens received "a full
and fair trial," 101 the effect of the Order was a crushing blow to American
democratic values, 102 including the rights to a presumption of innocence,
an independent judiciary, trial by jury, unanimous verdicts, public
proceedings, due process, and appeals to higher courts.
The Military Order gives the President (or, where designated, the
Secretary of Defense) the power to identify the particular persons who
will be tried by the military commission, 10 3 create the rules that the
commission will operate under, 1°4 appoint those who will be the
judges, 10 5 prosecutors, and defense lawyers, 10 6 and decide all appeals.10 7
The entire process can be held in secret, including execution, 108 and there
is no mechanism to provide for any accountability to Congress, the
courts, or the American public. 10 9 In this way, the Order provides the
President, and in some instances the Secretary of Defense, with the
greatest array of legal powers to be exercised in the justice system that
has ever been vested in a single person, office, or branch of government
since the birth of this nation. 110 In fact, the Order expresses the
President's unprecedented finding that, based upon "the nature of

101 Id. § 4(c)(2).
102
See, e.g., Maryam Elahi, Military Tribunals: A Travesty of Justice, 29 HuM. RTS. 15, 15
(Winter 2002) ("The president's executive order establishing military tribunals to try those
whom he deems to be 'terrorists' is not only in violation of international human rights law,
but it also flies in the face of U.S. domestic law."); Bryan Robinson, Due Process or Star
Chamber: Critics Worry Military Tribunals Will Violate Terror Suspects' Rights (Nov. 15, 2001),
at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/military- tribunals01115.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003) ("President Bush's order establishing military commissions to put
non-U.S. citizens accused of terrorism on trial will make it easier for the government to win
convictions - a decision civil libertarians believe could compromise the basic rights the
United States has defended.").
103 Military Order, supranote 100, § 2(a).
104 ld. § 4(c).
105 Id. § 4(b).
106

Id. § 4(c) (5).

107
108

Id. § 4(c) (8).
See id. § 4(c)(4)(B).

109

See id. § 7(b)(2).

110 See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE. L.J. 1259, 1277 (2002).
Under the Order, the executive branch acts as lawmaker, law-enforcer,
and judge. That is what James Madison warned against when he
wrote: "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
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international terrorism" and the danger to the United States, "it is not
practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.""'
Further, the Order's lack of any definition for the term "international
terrorism" 112 means that the President alone will determine the type of
conduct that will be held to violate the law. The Military Order also
appears to extend the jurisdiction of military commissions beyond trials
concerning "violations of the laws of war" to those concerning violations
of all "other applicable laws." 113 This broad phrase easily could be
invoked by the Executive branch to use military commissions to try
people accused of committing state and federal crimes that have no
relationship whatsoever to any terrorist activity.
In addition to the unlimited restraint upon one's liberty contained in
the Order's detention clauses," 4 the Military Order makes clear that no
persons brought before a military commission will be entitled to the
presumption of innocence, nor will they be entitled to the protection of
the requirement that there be proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."5 The Military Order also makes clear that other fundamental
principles of our justice system-principles aimed at ensuring the veracity
of the evidence presented and relied upon in convictions-are not
applicable in military tribunals. In this regard, all evidence deemed to
have "probative value to a reasonable person" may be used in the
116
proceeding.
The Order grants military commissions "exclusive jurisdiction" over
the covered offenses 1 7 such that individuals subject to the Order "shall
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding,

ill

Military Order, supra note 100, § 1(f); see Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military
Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2001) (criticizing the President's
assessment on the grounds that it "defies logic since its validity must be tested
contextually, yet it was made before the creation of any military commission for trial of any
particular persons and before any particular rules of evidence had been devised").
112
Military Order, supra note 100, § 2(a)(1)(ii).
113
Id. § 1(e) ("fIlt is necessary for individuals subject to this order ...to be tried for
violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.").
114
Id. §3.
115
But cf. infra text accompanying notes 140-47 (discussing the revised rules for trials of
suspected terrorists).
116
Military Order, supranote 100, § 4(c)(3).
117
Id. § 7(b)(1).
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directly or indirectly," in "any court of the United States," "any court of
any foreign nation," or "any international tribunal."118 The Order is
clearly intended to eliminate all judicial review of the process, including
the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"" 9 a fundamental
constitutional right.120
The Military Order expressly authorizes "closure" of a military
conmission's proceedings, permitting the President and the Secretary of
Defense to decide whether or not to conduct secret proceedings. 121 In
this way, the Military Order creates a system that answers only to the
President.
Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute permits the
President to create a military court with the jurisdiction to try all cases of
alleged international terrorism against the United States. 122
The
Constitution contains no article, section, or clause that provides the
President with the power to create military commissions, and the
Supreme Court has never held that the President has any implied
authority to do so absent congressional action.123
In fact, the
Constitution is quite clear that when Congress acts, it alone has the
authority to create and permit the use of military commissions. 124 This

118 Id. § 7(b)(2).
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2.
120 For a discussion of the constitutionality of the Order's attempt to indefinitely suspend
the right to seek habeas corpus relief, see Paust, supra note 111, at 12-26.
121 See Military Order, supra note 100, § 4(c)(4)(B); see also Cam Simpson, Binalshibha Likely
Candidatefor 1st Tribunal Trial, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2002, at 1 ("Experts said that in the Bush
administration's view Binalshibh is the ideal type to be tried by tribunal because of his
potential value as an intelligence source and the government's desire to subject him to
lawyer-free interrogation.").
122 See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1286 ("[N]either the terrorism statutes on the
books as of September 11, or the ones that Congress enacted afterward, provide for a
military trial for acts of terrorism.").
123

See id. at 1279-80.

Both the majority opinion and the Chase concurrence in Milligan hold
congressional authorization to be at least a necessary requirement for
such tribunals. This general principle of Milligan-a principle never
repudiated in subsequent cases-leaves the President little unilateral
freedom to craft an order to detain people on his own suspicion for
indefinite warehousing or trial at his pleasure in a system of military
justice.
Id.
124 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 13940 (1866) (Chase, J.,concurring and
dissenting).
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authority is created by the powers vested in Congress to "declare
War," 125 "raise Armies,"1 26 "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court," 12 7 "define and punish ...
Offences against the Law of
Nations," 128 and "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces.' 29
In addition, the Military Order is in clear violation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),130 which
became binding upon the United States in 1992.131 Among other
provisions contained in Article 14 of the ICCPR, the Order transgresses
an individual's right: to "a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law;" 132 to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty; 1 3 3 and to have "his conviction
and sentence ... reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law." 134
Furthermore, because the President's Order applies only to individuals
who are non-citizens, 135 it violates the ICCPR's ban on discriminatory

Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern
armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by
law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power
to execute in the President.... Congress cannot direct the conduct of
campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander under him,
without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and
punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians ....
Id. (emphasis added).
125
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENT
831 (2d ed. 1920).
[I]n general, it is those provisions of the Constitution which empower
Congress to "declare war" and "raise armies," and which, in
authorizing the initiation of war, authorize the employment of all
necessary and proper agencies for its due prosecution, from which this
tribunal derives its original sanction."
WINTHROP, supra.

126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
127 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
128 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
129

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.

130 Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter ICCPR].
131 See Mundis, supra note 73, at 324.
132 ICCPR, supra note 130, art. 14(1).
133
134

Id. art. 14(2).
Id. art. 14(5).

135 Military Order, supra note 100, § 2(a).
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and implicates equal protection guarantees under domestic

13 7

William Safire of the New York Times stated that the President has
assumed
what amounts to dictatorial power to jail or execute
aliens ....
[through use of] [h]is kangaroo court [that] can
conceal evidence by citing national security, make up its
own rules, find a defendant guilty even if a third of the
officers disagree, and execute an alien with no review by
138
any civilian court.
The President's plan has been seen as treating foreign suspects before
military courts with "second-or third-class justice." 139 In a sense, the
United States is presenting the image of an abandonment of a long-held
tradition of fairness and due process.
On March 21, 2002, due to mounting pressure, 140 the Bush
Administration modified the rules for trials of suspected terrorists before
military tribunals in the following manner: (1) defendants are provided
court-appointed military lawyers or, at their expense, are permitted to
privately retain counsel of choice; 141 (2) rules of evidence are relaxed to
allow hearsay testimony and less foundation for the admittance of
evidence obtained on the "battlefield;" 142 (3) trials are "public" in that
journalists are allowed to observe;143 (4) proceedings are closed where

136
137
138
139

See ICCPR, supra note 130, art. 14(1); Paust, supra note 111, at 17.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1298-1303.
William Safire, Seizing DictatorialPower, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31.
Reuters, Legal Expert Attacks US Plan for Military Courts (Nov. 24, 2001) (quoting

Richard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor for the U.N. war crimes tribunal), at
http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/25/int2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
140 Katherine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Military Tribunals: Government Sets Rules for
Military War Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al ("In establishing the rules ... the
administration made concessions to critics who worried that President Bush's original
order on Nov. 13 that established such tribunals had codified a secret rigged system that
could simply shuttle defendants to hasty deaths.").
141 Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, § 4(C)(3)(a), (b) (Mar. 21,
2002) [hereinafter MCO No. 1], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/
d20020321ord.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
142 Id. § 6(D)(1), (3).
143

Id. § 6(B)(3).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 8

586

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.37

there is discussion about classified materials;'" (5) defendants are
presumed innocent;145 (6) conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt by a two-thirds vote of the tribunal, but the invocation of the
death penalty requires a unanimous verdict;' 46 and (7) appeals would be
147
heard by panels of military and/or civilian specialists.
Contrary to the Administration's claims, 14 however, the regulations
may be ineffective in correcting the deficiencies contained in the
President's November 13th Military Order. Specifically, section 7(B) of
the Department of Defense's ("DOD") Military Commission Order
provides: "In the event of any inconsistency between the President's
Military Order and this Order, including any supplementary regulations
or instructions issued under Section 7(A), the provisions of the President's
Military Order shall govern." 149 As one author has noted,
[C]ommentators who have praised the regulations may
not have read far enough through them.... [Section
7(B)] could render the putative improvements made by
the regulations ... illusory.... [A]s long as the right to
answer such questions remains with the executive
branch itself, some of the central provisions of the
regulations may turn out to be ones "that palter with us
in a double sense, that keep the word of promise to our
150
ear, and break it to our hope."
Moreover, not enough attention has been focused on the threshold
question of whether the President's Order establishing special military

144

145
146

147

Id. § 4(A)(5)(a), 6(B)(3).
Id. § 5(B).

Id. § 6(F).
Id. § 6(H)(4).

See Seelye, supra note 140 ("Mr. Rumsfeld said the government had been working for
months to find ways to conduct the tribunals, known as commissions, in a manner that is
consistent... with fairness and justice under American law.").
149
MCO No. 1, supra note 141, § 7(B) (emphasis added); see Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism
Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH J. INT'L L. 677, 680-81
(2002); Paust, supra, at 678-90 (criticizing new DOD rules).
150
Eric M. Freedman, The Bush Military Tribunals: Where Have We Been? Where Are We
Going?, 17 CRIM. JusT. 14, 17 (Summer 2002) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act
148

5, sc. 8).
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commissions is ultra vires because it was issued without Congress first
formally declaring war.15'
In this regard, it is important to note that, following the September
11th attacks, Congress did not declare war, which is its exclusive province
under the separation of powers doctrine.15 2 The Joint Resolution passed
by Congress on September 18, 2001, was not a declaration of war but
only authorized the use of "force" to prevent "any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States." 153 In fact, "Congress
54
studiously avoided the use of the word 'war"' in its Resolution.
Furthermore, President Bush's strong rhetoric about the "war on
terrorism" notwithstanding, the United States is not "at war" with al56
Qa'da.155 Wars are confrontations between states, not individuals.

151 But see Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1266 ("The military trial of 'unlawful

combatants' is no different: Congress at a minimum must clearly provide by law for the
trial of such combatants by military commissions; it can do so either through a formal
declaration of war or by specific authorizing legislation."); id. at 1297 ("Because the
executive branch has acted ultra vires in even issuing the Order, the Order lacks the
constitutional basis necessary to survive separation-of-powers scrutiny."); Alfred Rubin,
Applying the Geneva Conventions: Military Commissions, Armed Conflict, and Al-Qaeda, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 79, 79 (Winter/Spring 2002) ("[Llegally, there is a serious
question as to the President's authority to establish [military commissions] in the absence
of a declaration of war by Congress."); Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of
Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of PresidentialPower, 4 U. PA. J. CONsT. L.
648, 656 (2002) ("Without a congressional declaration of war, however, the President's
authority to promulgate a directive like the [Military] Order is questionable. Historically,
such presidential actions have been circumscribed to conditions prevalent during
constitutionally declared wars.").
152
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is
entrusted only to Congress.").
153 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001); cf.
Koh, supra note 48, at 340 n.20 ("The Act of Congress passed immediately after September
11 does not authorize the adjudication by military connissions of past acts by
apprehended terrorists.").
154 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1285.
'55
See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 348-49 (rebuffing the notion of "the war" on
al-Qa' a).
The fact that military forces participate in law enforcement activities
against terrorists or drug traffickers has not in the past sufficed to
change the character of the "war on terrorism" or the "war on drugs"
from a criminal law paradigm to an armed conflict paradigm.
Id. at 346.
156
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 203 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed.
1952).
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The Bush Administration has cited to two United States Supreme
Court opinions, Ex parte Quirin5 7 and In re Yamashita,'58 in support of its
position that the President's Order establishing special military
commissions is not illegal. 5 9 These precedents, however, have not been
properly represented.
In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court addressed the propriety of
President Roosevelt's July 2, 1942, order appointing a special military
commission to try eight Nazis who came to the United States by
submarine and who were alleged to have entered the country for the
purpose of destroying war industries and facilities.16° Roosevelt's order,
however, was issued long after the United States had formally declared
war against Germany. 161 Moreover, not only did the Quirin court
"mak[e] much of the fact that war had been declared," 162 but it
specifically noted that "[i]t is unnecessary for present purposes to
determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has
constitutional power to create military commissions without the support
163
of Congressional legislation."
Less than one month after the President Roosevelt's order, the
Supreme Court upheld the legality of the petitioners' trial on the ground
that the prisoners were "unlawful belligerents" on U.S. soil during a war
officially declared by Congress.'6
Yet, at that time, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 did not exist, and the laws and customs of war were
that combatants not wearing a uniform, acting behind enemy lines, and
engaging in acts of espionage or sabotage, could be subject to execution
65
by a firing squad if such facts were established:

157 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
18
327 U.S. 1 (1946).
159 See Jess Bravin, Bush Signs Executive Order EstablishingMilitary Tribunals to Try Terror
Suspects, WALL ST.J., Nov. 14, 2001, at A3; Justice Deformed: War and the Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, § 4, at 14 [hereinafter Justice Deformed].
160 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21, 23.
161
See Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-331, 55 Stat. 796, 796 (1941).
162
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1281; see id. at 1281 n.86 (marshaling citations from
Quirin that indicate the necessity of a declared war).
16 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
164 Id. at 30-37, 48.
16 Mundis, supra note 73, at 321 ("Because unlawful combatants, saboteurs, and spies,
among others, are not subject to the jurisdiction of court-martial, such persons have
historically been prosecuted by military commissions.").
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By a long course of practical administrative construction
by its military authorities, our Government has likewise
recognized that those who during time of war pass
surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own,
discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life
or property, have the status of unlawful combatants
punishable as such by military commission.66
This is surely not the case, however, with respect to civilians in the
United States-even those who may plan or who have engaged in
criminal acts which we now call terrorism. 167 The criminal laws of the
United States and the criminal justice system that we have can more than
adequately deal with these situations.168
Lastly, the precedential value of Quirin is highly suspect, 169 as "a
principal reason for authorization of these military tribunals was the
government's wish to cover up the evidence of the FBI's bungling of the
case." 170 Accordingly, the Bush Administration's reliance on Quirin is
misplaced.
In addition, any attempt to find support for the President's Military
Order in 10 U.S.C. § 821 is similarly unavailing. Section 821, which is
Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, provides, in pertinent
part:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction
upon
courts-martial
do not deprive
military
commissions ... or other military tribunals of concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
166 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35.
167 Cf. Koh, supra note 48, at 340 ("Quirin nowhere gave the president carte blanche
unilaterally to create an alternative military system of criminal justice for suspicious aliens
captured abroad.").
168 Id. at 337 ("[Flederal prosecutors have successfully tried and convicted in U.S. courts
numerous members of Al Qaeda, the very terrorist group charged with planning the
September 11 attacks, for earlier attacks on the World Trade Center and the U.S. embassies
in Tanzania and Kenya.").
169 Id. at 340 n.17.

170 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1291; see David J. Danelski, The Saboteur's Case, 1 J.
SuP. CT. HIsT. 61 (1996); see also Justice Deformed, supranote 159 (pointing out that the trial in
Quirin "was an embarrassing skirting of the legal process that occurred mainly to cover up
the FBI's failure to listen when one of the saboteurs attempted to confess and turn in his
comrades").
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statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions... or other military tribunals. 171
The predecessor of § 821 was Article 15 of the Articles of War, 172 upon
which the Court in Quirin predicated its ruling that President Roosevelt
was justified in issuing his July 1942 order establishing the military
commission:
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15,
Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may
constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law
of war in appropriate cases. ... By his Order creating
the present Commission [the President] has undertaken
to exercise the authority conferred upon him by
Congress .... 173
Yet, the Supreme Court distinctly qualified its holding by noting that
"the President, as Commander in Chief, by his Proclamation in time of
war has invoked that law."174 In any event,
independent evidence [demonstrates] that 821 did not
absorb constructions its predecessor, Article 15, had
been given during declared wars: When the UCMJ was
codified in 1950, Congress deleted the words "in time of
war" from another provision, Article of War 78, to make
clear that that provision, evidently in contrast to such
others as Article 15, permitted a court-martial to impose
death or other punishment for certain forms of trespass
in circumstances "amounting to a state of belligerency,
but where a formal state of war does not exist."
In general, the UCMJ has been read narrowly to
avoid military trials, in the absence of a formal declarationof
war, of those who do not serve in our armed forces....
The UCMJ's term "in a time of war" thus requires a
congressionally declared war to provide jurisdiction

17

10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).

172 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1287.

173 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
174

Id. (emphasis added).
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over civilians for courts-martial or military tribunals.
This strict reading provides an answer to those who
treat Quirin as giving a definitive gloss to 821, for it
explains why the Court's "in time of war" language
should be read narrowly....
Indeed, if the UCMJ were stretched to give the
President the power to create the tribunals purportedly
authorized by this Order, then it would risk making the
statute an unconstitutional delegation of power.175
In re Yamashita, another case arising out of the Second World War,
involved General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was tried before a military
commission convened in the Philippine Islands by order of General
Douglas MacArthur pursuant to the latter's authority as military
commander in the field under the Articles of War. 176 Yamashita, the
former commander of the Japanese armed forces in the Philippines, was
charged with failing to control the activities of his troops and permitting
them to commit numerous atrocities. 177 Despite the fact that no
affirmative act was alleged or proven against him,178 the commission
found Yamashita guilty and sentenced him to death by hanging.1 7 9 After
the Supreme Court denied relief, the commander was executed 80
Contrary to the claims of the Bush Administration, however,
language from the Court's opinion directly undercuts the assertion that
the President's Order is valid absent a formal declaration of war. For, in
its decision, the Yamashita Court explicitly cautioned that the power of
military tribunals to try and punish combatants is without qualification
only "so long as a state of war exists-from its declaration until peace is
proclaimed." 181 Additionally, the proceedings in Yamashita have since
been severely criticized by legal scholars. 182 Thus, claims that these two
World War II cases justify the present Military Order are baseless.

Katyal & Tribe, supra note 110, at 1288-90 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1946).
177 Id. at 13-14.
178 Id. at 34 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 5.
180 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANrY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
175

176

LAW 431 (2d rev. ed. 1999).
181 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
182 A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA (1949); F.J.P. VEALE, ADVANCE TO
BARBARISM:

How

THE REVERSION TO BARBARISM IN WARFARE AND WAR-TRIALS MENACES
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The policies and practices mentioned above in connection with the
President's Order establishing military commissions bring no credit to
this government nor to this people in the eyes of the world, but our blind
spot to others' perceptions makes us lose sight where it is in our national
interest to see clearly. As a result, we believe in our own propaganda
and reject the truths that others see. And, in time, we ask incredulously
why it is that we are disliked and even hated by so many. Seeing
ourselves in the reflection of our own mirror leads us to the conclusion
that it is "they" who are wrong. After all, that mirror tells us that we are
the fairest of them all.
F. The USA PATRIOT Act and its ConstitutionalValidity
After scant deliberation, the United States Congress passed the
"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" ("USA
PATRIOT Act" or "Act"), 183 which was signed into law by President
Bush on October 26, 2001.1M The passage of the Act caused much debate
due to its many controversial provisions that violate equal protection
and due process. 185 It is also noteworthy that these very provisions,
which comprise the heart of the USA PATRIOT Act, were already
prepared long before the attack that occurred on September 11th. 186 The
happenings of September 11th simply provided law-enforcement and
intelligence interests with the golden opportunity to (1) enact proposals
1 87
that previously had been rejected or were found to be unconstitutional
and (2) enlarge their own powers while concomitantly eroding the civil
liberties of law-abiding American citizens.
Contrary to popular

OUR FUTURE 224-26 (1953); M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five
Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
11, 36-37 (1997).
183 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The USA PATRIOT Act can also be found in
U.S. FEDERAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 309496 (Yonah Alexander & Edgar H.

Brenner eds., 2002) [hereinafter RESPONSES]. This source is very helpful because it includes
the language of the Act itself and the pertitent sections of the United States Code that it
altered.
184 RESPONSES, supranote 183, at xxvi.
185 See sources cited infra note 287.
186 Jennifer Van Bergen, The USA PATRIOT Act Was Planned Before 9/11 (May 20, 2002)
("Many people do not know that the USA PATRIOT Act was already written and ready to
go long before September 11th."), at http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/05.21B.jvb.usapa.
911.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) ; see JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002).

187 Van Bergen, supra note 186.
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perception, the USA PATRIOT Act is not directed exclusively at
suspected foreign terrorists. 188
1.

Coordination Between Law Enforcement and Intelligence

Perhaps the USA PATRIOT Act's greatest threat to personal privacy,
as well as to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of "probable
cause,"1 89 is contained in the Act's provisions that sanction the sharing of
information between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Traditionally, law enforcement has focused on the investigation of
crime and the collection of evidence for trial. 1 90 The methods by which
such evidence is obtained are often subject to public scrutiny, and law
enforcement organizations are generally required to operate within the
strict parameters of the law. 191 In contrast, intelligence agencies operate
in secret; their activities are often illegal, and they give "the highest
priority to protection of [their] sources and methods." 192 In addition,
such organizations engage in covert disruption 93 and, when operating
abroad, have been known to participate directly in the destabilization of
foreign regimes. 94
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") is, of course, considered
the leading national law enforcement agency in the United States, being
described by the Attorney General as "the primary criminal investigative
agency in the federal government." 195 On the other hand, the Central

18

See Nancy Chang, The USA PATRIOT Act: What's So PatrioticAbout Trampling on the
Bill of Rights? (Nov. 2001) at 2, at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/USAPATRIOTACT.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) ("The Administration's blatant power grab,
coupled with the wide array of anti-terrorism tools that the USA PATRIOT Act puts at its
disposal, portends a wholesale suspension of civil liberties that will reach far beyond those
who are involved in terrorist activities.").
189 Van Bergen, supra note 186 ("For all practical purposes, the section 218 USAPA
amendment of FISA allows government to completely avoid Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirements for searches and seizures of American citizens (not just immigrants).").
190 See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND
TERRORISM
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS
10 (May
30, 2002),

http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES] ("A general crimes investigation ... may be conducted

to prevent, solve, or prosecute such criminal activity.").
191 Kate Martin, Intelligence, Terrorism, and Civil Liberties, 29 HUM. RTS.5, 6 (Winter 2002).
192

Id.

193

Id.

194 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14.
195 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, supranote 190, at ii.
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Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), from its creation in 1947 by the National
Security Act, has been statutorily prohibited from exercising any "police,
196
subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions."
It has always been understood that the CIA's intelligence operations
97
were to be directed overseas and to focus on foreign nationals.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, an unprecedented amount of
intelligence activity in the United States was directed at innocent citizens
and domestic organizations by, inter alia, the FBI, the CIA, and the
military. 198
Following revelations of the alarming scope of such
activities, the Senate "Church Committee" ("Committee") issued a
lengthy report in which it concluded that
virtually every element of our society has been subjected
to excessive government-ordered intelligence inquiries.
Opposition to government policy or the expression of
controversial views was frequently considered sufficient
for collecting data on Americans.
The committee finds that this extreme breadth of
intelligence activity is inconsistent with the principles of
our Constitution which protect the rights of speech,
political activity, and privacy against unjustified
governmental intrusion. 199
The Committee further found that
such intelligence surveillance of groups and individuals
has greatly exceeded the legitimate interest of the
government in law enforcement and the prevention of
violence. Where unsupported determinations as to
'potential' behavior are the basis for surveillance of
groups and individuals, no one is safe from the
2°°
inquisitive eye of the intelligence agency.

19

50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2000).

S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. 3, at 684 (1976) ("CIA's charter in the 1947 National Security
Act speaks of 'intelligence.' The legislative history establishes that this means 'foreign
intelligence' in the case of the CIA."); James X. Dempsey, Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis, 29
HUM. RTS. 8, 9 (Winter 2002).
198
S.REP.No. 94-755, bk. 2, at 165-82.
19
Id. bk. 2, at 169.
200
Id. bk. 2, at 177-78.
197
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Significantly, the Committee noted that intelligence agencies
"pursued a 'vacuum cleaner' approach to intelligence collection drawing
in all available information about groups and individuals, including
201
their lawful political activities and details of their personal lives."
Among other unlawful government intrusions, the Committee
highlighted the FBI's COINTELPRO operation, a clandestine program in
which the FBI conducted undercover surveillance and disrupted political
and religious groups that it viewed as threatening, 202 and the CIA's
CHAOS project, in which the CIA "amassed thousands of files on
Americans, indexed hundreds of thousands of Americans into its
computer records, and disseminated thousands of reports to the FBI and
other government offices." 20 3 In this latter regard, the Committee
pointed out that the CIA
expanded its program, increasing its coverage of
Americans overseas and building an even larger 'data
base' on domestic political activity. Intelligence was
exchanged with the FBI, National Security Agency, and
other agencies, and eventually CIA agents who had
infiltrated domestic organizations for other purposes
20 4
supplied general information on the groups' activities.
In addition, the Army's surveillance of civilians was described in
Senate Report 1183 ("Report") as "[o]ne of the most pervasive of the
intrusive information programs which have concerned the Congress and
the public in recent years." 205 The Report described such military
monitoring as follows:
Allegedly for the purpose of predicting and
preventing civil disturbances which might develop
beyond the control of state and local officials, Army
agents were sent throughout the country to keep
surveillance over the way the civilian population
expressed [its] sentiments about government policies. In
churches, on campuses, in classrooms, in public
meetings, they took notes, taperecorded, and

201

2M
m3
204

20

Id. bk. 2, at 178.
Id. bk. 3, at 1-77.
Id. bk. 3, at 682; see id. bk. 3, at 681-732.
Id. bk. 2, at 181.
S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6928.
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photographed people who dissented in thought, word
or deed.
This included clergymen, editors, public
officials, and anyone who sympathized with the
dissenters.
Out of this surveillance the Army created
...
blacklists of organizations and personalities which were
circulated to many federal, state and local agencies,
[which] were all requested to supplement the data
provided. Not only descriptions of the contents of
speeches and political comments were included, but
irrelevant entries about personal finances, such as the
fact that a militant leader's credit card was withdrawn.
In some cases, a psychiatric diagnosis taken from Army
or other medical records was included.
This information on individuals was programmed
into at least four computers according to their political
beliefs, or their memberships, or their geographic
residence.
The Army did not just collect and share this
information.
Analysts were assigned the task of
evaluating and labeling these people on the basis of
reports on their attitudes, remarks and activities. They
were then coded for entry into computers or microfilm
20 6
data banks.
Following the intelligence abuses of the early 1970s, there was a
significant effort in the United States
to create a wall between law enforcement and
intelligence agencies and to eject the CIA from domestic
activities. That wall has been most visible in the
Title 111207
statutory authorities for eavesdropping:
governs wiretapping in the investigation of crimes and
2°8
the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

Id. at 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6929 (quoting Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong. (1971)) (containing a
summary of Senator Ervin's statements).
207 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
208 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000).
206
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governs wiretapping of agents of a foreign power inside
the United States for the purpose of gathering foreign
209
intelligence.
This separation between law enforcement and intelligence was also
clearly evidenced in the two sets of guidelines, first prepared by the
Attorney General in 1976 that established rules to regulate the FBI's
bifurcated duties: (1) The Attorney General's Guidelines on General
Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism
Investigations 210 and (2) Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign
211
Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations.
These guidelines provided "one set of rules for criminal investigations
and another for gathering foreign intelligence relating to espionage or
212
international terrorism inside the United States."
Yet, following the September 11th attacks, the safeguards separating
law enforcement and intelligence were rapidly dismantled. Several
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are especially pertinent in this
regard.
For example, section 203 of the Act provides that "it shall be lawful
for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence ...or foreign intelligence
information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to
any Federal law enforcement, intelligence ...or national security official
in order to assist the official receiving that information in the
performance of his official duties." 213 Because the definition of "foreign
intelligence information" is so expansive, 214 "the sharing of such a broad
range of information raises the specter of intelligence agencies, once
again, collecting, profiling, and potentially harassing U.S. persons
215
engaged in lawful, First Amendment-protected activities."
In a similar vein, section 905 of the Act provides, in pertinent part,
that

Martin, supra note 191, at 5 (citations added).
210 http://www.cnss.gwu.edu/-cnss/levismithdomesticcrimes.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
211 http://www.cnss.gwu.edu/-cnss/forinteguidel995.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
212 Martin, supra note 191, at 5.
213 USA PATRIOT Act § 203(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 281 (2001).
214 Id. § 203(d)(2), 115 Stat. at 281.
215 John Podesta, USA Patriot Act: The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, 29 HUM. Rm. 3, 3
(Winter 2002).
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the Attorney General, or the head of any other
department or agency of the Federal Government with
law enforcement responsibilities, shall expeditiously
disclose to the Director of Central Intelligence... foreign
intelligence acquired by an element of the Department of
Justice or an element of such department or agency, as
the case may be, in the course of a criminal
216
investigation.
It is important to point out that the disclosure of such information is
mandatory under the statutory language.
In addition, section 218 of the Act lowers the standard by which
foreign intelligence information can be gathered for use as evidence in
criminal cases. Prior to the passage of the Act, the FBI was authorized
under FISA to conduct electronic surveillance and to carry out physical
searches without satisfying the probable cause standard required in
criminal cases. 217 FISA mandated only that the government applicant
had probable cause to believe that the target was "an agent of a foreign
power." 218 Yet, because of the extraordinary nature of wiretaps and
searches under FISA (the target "is never notified of the intrusion"), the
use of such methods was permitted only on the understanding that such
219
surveillance techniques would not be utilized for investigating crimes.
Congress, however, recognized that, during the process of gathering
foreign intelligence information, evidence of crimes, such as espionage,
might be collected. 220 Thus, Congress allowed the use of material
collected under FISA to be used as evidence in criminal cases but only in
circumstances where the "primary purpose" of the investigation was the
gathering of foreign intelligence.221 Otherwise, FISA would provide the
government with a loophole by which to bypass the traditional probable
cause requirements mandated for searches and seizures in criminal
cases. 222 Section 218 of the Act, however, amended FISA to allow

216 USA PATRIOT Act § 905(a)(2) 115 Stat. at 388-89(emphasis added).
217 Dempsey, supra note 197, at 10.
218
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(3)(A), 1824(a)(3)(A) (2000).
219 Dempsey, supranote 197, at 10.
220

Id.

221 Id.; cf. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000).
2
Dempsey, supra note 197, at 10; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
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wiretaps and searches as long as "a significant purpose" of the
223
surveillance is the gathering of foreign intelligence information.
Furthermore, on May 30, 2002, the Attorney General issued a new set
of guidelines, which announced that the FBI's "highest priority is to
protect the security of the nation and the safety of the American people
against the depredations of terrorists and foreign aggressors." 224 More
significantly, the revised guidelines provide that, "[f]or the purpose of
detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the FBI is authorized to visit
any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the same
terms and conditions as members of the public generally. " 225 This
authorization eliminates the decades-old restriction that prevented the
FBI from spying on lawful activities, including political gatherings and
226
religious services, absent some indication of a potential federal crime.
In fact, the new guidelines even purport to supercede the restrictions of
§ 552a(e)(7) of the Privacy Act, 227 which prohibits executive agencies
from collecting and maintaining First Amendment records, by
unilaterally declaring that all of the investigative conduct contemplated
by the revised guidelines constitutes "authorized law enforcement
activit[ies]" and that, therefore, maintenance of materials collected by
such methods is justified. 228
Thus, under the pretext of the war on terrorism, United States law
enforcement and intelligence agencies have again been empowered to
work in concert with each other, with almost unlimited discretion to
choose the targets of their attention. Some of the immediate dangers
inherent in such a union are summarized below:

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23 USA PATRIOT Act § 218,115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001); see Dempsey, supra note 197, at 10.
224 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, supra note 190, at ii.
M2 Id. at 22.

226 David Cole, Misdirected Snooping, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 5, 2002, at 6, 24; see Neil A.
Lewis, Echo of FBI Abuses in Queries on New Role, id., June 13, 2002, at 2 (quoting
Representative Sensenbrenner's question that, "given the fact that the FBI is stretched to
the limit, why should they be investigating matters when there is no criminal activity
suggested?"); Adam Liptak, FBI Faces No Legal Obstacles to Domestic Spying, id., May 31,
2002, at 2, 24.
227 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2000). For a discussion of § 552a(e)(7), see generally Steven W.
Becker, Comment, Maintaining Secret Government Dossiers on the FirstAmendment Activities
of American Citizens: The Law Enforcement Activity Exception to the Privacy Act, 50 DEPAUL L.
REv. 675 (2000).
22
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, supranote 190, at 23.
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Privacy Concerns. As the domestic experience of the United
States in the late 1960s and early 1970s vividly illustrates,
when law enforcement and intelligence are allowed to work
in tandem, the inevitable result will be that innocent and
protected activity will be monitored, catalogued, and
retained for future use against individuals who find
themselves at odds with the prevailing government
authority. In addition, even where the inquiring agency is
investigating potential criminal conduct, experience teaches
that, under the "vacuum cleaner" approach, agents will
compile data on a group's lawful pursuits, as well as private
information on the organization's individual members. 229

229
230

*

Evidentiary Standards. Another serious objection to allowing
the sharing of information between intelligence and law
enforcement is that the evidentiary value of materials used
in criminal prosecutions may become tainted because
materials were not obtained under the appropriate and
elevated law-enforcement standard. For example, if foreign
intelligence information is shared with a law enforcement
agency or prosecutors, and such material (or any
information obtained therefrom) is later introduced at a
criminal trial, the evidence could be suppressed on the
grounds that it was not obtained under the accepted
criminal standard, i.e., probable cause. Such commingling of
information could result in the inadmissibility of critical
evidence or, ultimately, in the dismissal of entire cases. 230

"

Indicia of Reliability. In addition, information gained by
means of foreign intelligence techniques does not have the
same assurance of reliability and accuracy as that obtained
in accordance with traditional law-enforcement standards.
For one thing, hearsay, which is an integral component of
the foreign intelligence dynamic, is generally inadmissible in
penal proceedings.
Secondly, because the intelligence
community operates clandestinely, often illegally, and,
above all, seeks to protect its intelligence-gathering methods
and contacts, the manner in which intelligence information

See supra text accompanying note 201.
See John Gibeaut, Winds of Change, 87 A.B.A. J. 32, 33-34 (Nov. 2001).
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is procured and the sources of such data cannot be disclosed
and, thus, are not subject to adversary testing.
"

Disruption. Cooperation between law enforcement and
intelligence also poses an increased danger for deliberate
disruption of lawful associations based upon political
targeting.
Intelligence agencies often participate in
disruption and, in the case of operations abroad, in the
destabilization of undesirable regimes. As is demonstrated
by previous domestic experience in the United States, these
same tactics will eventually be adopted by law enforcement
organizations acting in concert with intelligence agencies.

*

Definition of "Terrorism." Until there is an internationally
recognized
and sufficiently restrictive definition of
"terrorism," the confluence of law enforcement and
intelligence should be avoided. Presently, the international
community has yet to agree upon a single definition of
"terrorism" or "terrorists." 2 31
Without a narrow and
workable definition of terrorism, anyone involved in
political activity, lawful dissent, religious observance, or
even humanitarian and charitable efforts, will be subject to
2 32
surveillance, seizure of assets, and criminal prosecution.
Furthermore,
such
comprehensive
governmental
monitoring, or even just the threat of it, will have a chilling
233
effect on the exercise of these cherished activities.

*

Effectiveness in the Fight Against Terrorism. Lastly, there is
little proof that the marriage between law enforcement and
intelligence will appreciably advance the battle against

William C. Smith, Legal Arsenal: International Law Can Be an Important Element in the
United States' Campaign Against Terrorism, id. 43, 44 (Dec. 2001) (citing the opinion of
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni).
232 See David Cole, Terrorizing Immigrants in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HUM. RTs.
11, 12 (Winter 2002) ("Once a group is designated as a 'terrorist group,' aliens are
deportable for asking people to join it, fundraising for it, or providing any kind of material
support to it, including dues."); Curtis Lawrence, Charges Against Charity Stand: Judge
Clears Way for Perjury Trial, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 14, 2002, at 10 (describing government
proceedings against Benevolence International Foundation, a Muslim charity); see also
Steven W. Becker, The USA PATRIOT Act, Profiling, and U.S. Double Standards, in MICHELLE
GOODWIN, RACE DEMOCRACY & CITIZENSHIP: RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA (forthcoming
Dec. 2003) (discussing the targeting of Muslim charities).
233 See Becker, supra note 227, at 698-99, 739.
231
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terrorism. Following the September 11th assault, the FBI,
CIA, and the National Security Agency ("NSA") were each
independently criticized for failing to act on information that
each agency already had in its possession, which could have
helped to prevent, or at least warn of, the coming attack. 234
Since each agency, whether through incompetence or
administrative inefficiency, failed to act upon material
information in its own hands, why would we consider that
such agencies would work more effectively together? It is
well known that the larger the bureaucracy, the less
effectively it operates. To conjoin these law enforcement and
intelligence organizations would not enhance their collective
ability to fight terrorism, it would only further depreciate it,
along with our privacy.
That the above concerns are well grounded is amply demonstrated
by the very recent and almost unprecedented release of an opinion from
the secret United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC"). 235 The FISC has been described as "a modern Star Chamber
[that] meets behind a cipher-locked door in a windowless, bug-proof,
vault-like room guarded 24 hours a day on the top floor of the Justice
236
Department building."
On August 22, 2002, the FISC released its May 17, 2002, opinion in In
re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,237 in
which it severely criticized federal agents for providing erroneous

2m The FBI was criticized for its handling of the Zacarias Moussaoui case; the CIA for its
inability to promptly convince the FBI to track two of the alleged September 11th hijackers,
which the CIA knew had met with al-Qa'&da personnel in Malaysia in January 2000; and the
NSA for its failure to translate two intercepted messages, which identified September 11th
as "zero day" and the beginning of the "match," until September 12th. See Ted Bridis, FBI
Plans Total Makeover Amid Criticism of Terror Intelligence, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 29, 2002,
at 3; 'Zero Day': Specific Translations of Possible Pre-Sept. 11 Conversation Revealed (June 19,
(last
2002), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/US/DailyNews/intercept911020619.html
visited Mar. 10, 2003).
235 James Bamford, U.S. justice Department Bends the Rules, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 27,
2002, at 5 (noting that this is only the second opinion publicly released by the United States
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") in its almost twenty-five year history).
2M Id. ("A key problem is that, in its nearly 25-year history, the secret court has approved
over 10,000 warrants-with the numbers growing every year-and never turned down a
single request.").
237 No. 02-429 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. May 17, 2002),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/fisa51702opn.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2003) [hereinafter In re FISC].
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information to the court in more than seventy-five applications for secret
wiretaps and search warrants. 238 Specifically, the court pointed out that
"[i]n virtually every instance, the government's misstatements and
omissions in FISA applications and violations of the Court's orders
involved information sharing and unauthorized disseminations to
criminal investigators and prosecutors." 239 The court also stated that a
fair reading of the government's proposed new supplementary
minimization procedures 240 led to only one conclusion:
[Clriminal prosecutors are to have a significant role
directing FISA surveillances and searches from start to
finish in counterintelligence cases having overlapping
intelligence and criminal investigations or interests,
guiding them to criminal prosecution. The government
makes no secret of this policy, asserting its interpretation
of the [USA PATRIOT] Act's new amendments which
"allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement
purpose.
Given our experience in FISA surveillances and
searches, we find that these provisions ... particularly
those which authorize criminal prosecutors to advise FBI
intelligence officials on the initiation, operation,
continuation or expansion of FISA's intrusive seizures,
are designed to enhance the acquisition, retention and
dissemination of evidence for law enforcement purposes,
instead of being consistent with the need of the United
States to "obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence information" as mandated in [50 U.S.C.]
§1801(h) and §1821(4). The 2002 procedures appear to
be designed to amend the law and substitute the FISA
for Title III electronic surveillances and Rule 41 searches.
This may be because the government is unable to meet

2
Id. at 16-17; see Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Secret Terror Court Rebukes U.S.: Justice
Department Accused of Repeatedly Lying to Obtain Warrants, Wiretaps, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23,
2002, at 1.
239 In re FISC, supranote 237, at 18.
240 "Minimization procedures" are those specific procedures designed to "minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available
information concerning unconsenting United States persons...." Id. at 8.
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the substantive requirements of these law enforcement
tools ....
241

The FISC held that, with respect to portions of the government's
proposed procedures, "the intrusiveness of foreign intelligence
surveillance and searches on the privacy of U.S. persons" was not
"'consistent' with the need of the United States to collect foreign
242
intelligence information from foreign powers and their agents."
After the rebuke it received from the secret foreign intelligence court,
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") then launched its ill-fated "Operation
TIPS" ("TIPS"), which is an acronym for "Terrorism Information and
Prevention System." 243 Through this program, the government sought to
recruit "meter readers, truck drivers, cable guys, and other workers
whose jobs routinely take them through the nation's neighborhoods to
report signs of terrorism to a national hotline." 244 Fortunately, TIPS met
with immediate and widespread opposition. The United States Postal
Service refused to participate in TIPS. 245 Civil liberties organizations
accused the government of trying to form an "unlicensed security force
conducting warrantless searches of people's homes." 246 Legislators
voiced fears that TIPS would create an Orwellian database to collect and
maintain information on innocent citizens. 247 The DOJ's proposal to
encourage Americans to spy on each other for the government is
frighteningly reminiscent of the well-known practice in former

Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8-9; see id. at 25. Unfortunately, this well-reasoned opinion by the FISC was
subsequently reversed by the first and only decision ever issued by the United States
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001 (U.S.
Foreign Intelligence Ct. Rev. Nov. 18, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
terrorism/fisa111802opn.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2003). The reviewing court, however, did
concede that if the FISC "concluded that the government's sole objective was merely to
gain evidence of past criminal conduct-even foreign intelligence crimes-.. . the application
should be denied." Id. at 35.
243 See Andy Newman, Operation TIPS: Citizen Snoops Wanted to Report Signs of Terrorism,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 24, 2002, at 1.
244
Id.
245
Postal Service Isn't Involved in Anti-Terror 'TIPS' Program,id., July 18, 2002, at 1.
246 Newman, supra note 243.
247 Jesse J. Holland, Ashcrofl Says TIPS Program Won't Affect Civil Liberties, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., July 26, 2002, at 2.
241
242
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communist countries of neighbors turning in one another to the
248
authorities.
2.

"Domestic Terrorism"

One of the other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that has
sparked the most controversy is that which creates a new federal crime
denominated "domestic terrorism." 249 Because the Act's definition of
"domestic terrorism" is so expansive, it jeopardizes our much-cherished
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and political association. 250
Specifically, section 802 defines "domestic terrorism" to include any
criminal act occurring primarily within the United States that is
"dangerous to human life" which "appear[s] to be intended" "to
25
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion." '
Due to the vague and broad terms of the provision, there is likely to be
criminalization of legitimate dissent and the authorization of federal law
enforcement agencies to investigate and conduct surveillance of various
organizations based on their opposition to official policies. 252 Also,
minor offenses perpetrated by groups such as Green Peace during its
2 3
protests will constitute "domestic terrorism." 5
3.

"Sneak and Peek" Searches

Section 213 of the Act permits "sneak and peek" searches, whereby
law enforcement officials are authorized to delay notice of physical or
electronic searches by making a showing that "immediate notification of
the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result." 254 In other
words, federal agents could "enter your home, office, or other private
place and conduct a search, take photographs, and download your
computer files without notifying you until after the fact." 25 5 In this

Michele Kayal, Beyond Civil Liberties: The Societal Costs of Surveillance, id., July 26, 2002,
at 5; Newman, supra note 243.
249 Steve Lash, Aftermath of Sept. 11 Sparks Debate on Security, Liberties, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Apr. 27, 2002, at 1.
250
For an overview of the right to association, see Becker, supra note 227, at 697-99.
21
USA PATRIOT Act § 802(a)(5), 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001).
252 Chang, supra note 188, at 2.
253 See id. ("Environmental activists, anti-globalization activists, and anti-abortion
activists who use direct action to further their political agendas are particularly vulnerable
to prosecution as 'domestic terrorists."').
2M
USA PATRIOT Act § 213,115 Stat. at 285-86.
255 Anthony D. Romero, In Defense of Liberty at a Time of National Emergency, 29 HUM. RTs.
16, 16 (Winter 2002).
248
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regard, the contemporaneous notice that is normally required by the
Fourth Amendment in such situations256 could be suspended for
months. 257 Furthermore, this provision is equally applicable to United
States citizens as to aliens suspected of terrorism. 258 In addition,
section213's fundamental alteration of traditional law enforcement
procedures is not subject to the Act's sunset provisions. 259
4.

Monitoring Computer and Internet Use

Section 216 of the Act "substantially changes the law with respect to
law enforcement access to information about computer use including
Web surfing." 260 Enlarging upon concepts relating to pen registers and
trap-and-trace devices, which were designed to record incoming and
outgoing phone numbers, 261 section 216 permits the installation of
devices that monitor all computer "dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information" based upon nothing more than the certification of
a government attorney or state investigative or law enforcement officer
that "the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 262
This permits
government officials to record intimately private information such as the
addresses to which you send e-mails and the Internet web sites that you
visit.

263

Lastly, notwithstanding language in this provision to the effect that
recorded information "shall not include the contents of any
communication," 264 the intrusive powers granted to government officials
by section 216 are so pregnant for abuse as to render the above
prohibition virtually meaningless. This is because the address portion of
most e-mails contains a description of the subject of the communication,
and, of course, once the surveillance device records the web page being

256 Without such notice, the person subjected to the search cannot contest the warrant's
deficiencies with the executing officer or challenge whether the search was conducted in
accordance with the warrant's terms. Chang, supra note 188, at 3; see U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
257 Dempsey, supra note 197, at 9.
258 Id.

259 Id.
260 Podesta, supra note 215, at 3.
261

Id.

262 USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), (c), 115 Stat. 272, 288-90 (2001).
263 See Romero, supra note 255, at 16.
264 USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c), 115 Stat. at 290
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visited, a government agent can return to that page and learn precisely
265
the "contents" of what the subject of the surveillance was viewing.
5.

Roving Wiretaps

Section 206 of the Act 266 amends FISA and eases restrictions
involving domestic intelligence gathering by "allow[ing] a single wiretap
to legally 'roam' from device to device, to tap the person rather than the
phone."

267

This provision could pose particular problems of intrusion because it
would, for example, permit the government to tap all of the pay phones
in a geographic area simply on the basis that a suspected terrorist was in
268
the neighborhood.
6.

Grand Jury Secrecy Compromised

Traditionally, the disclosure of grand jury materials has, with few
exceptions, been limited to those directly participating in the federal
criminal law enforcement process, such as government attorneys and
their assistants. 269 Section 203(a)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Act, however,
dramatically alters the rules relating to grand jury secrecy. The Act now
"permits disclosure, without court order, to a long list of federal agencies
Specifically,
with duties unrelated to law enforcement." 270
section 203(a)(1) amends Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)
to allow disclosure "when the matters involve foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence ... or foreign intelligence information ... to any
Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national

See Chang, supranote 188, at 3.
Unlike telephone communications, where the provision of dialing
information does not run the risk of revealing content, email messages
move together in packets that include both address and content
information. Also, the question of whether a list of web sites and web
pages that have been visited constitutes "dialing, routing, addressing
and signaling information" or "content" has yet to be resolved.
Id. (footnote omitted).
266 USA PATRIOT Act § 206,115 Stat. at 282.
267 Podesta, supra note 215, at 4.
265

268

Id.

2
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, Assessing the USA
PATRIOTAct's Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 17 CRIM. JUST. 42,43-44 (Summer 2002).
270 Beale & Felman, supra note 269, at 46.
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defense, or national security official in order to assist the official
271
receiving that information in the performance of his official duties."
Apart from the obvious risk that such expansive disclosure poses to
the preservation of the secrecy of the materials themselves, there is no
judicial supervision of the disclosures, nor is there any requirement that
the requesting official make a showing of need in order to override the
presumption of secrecy. 272 These lack of safeguards are particularly
troubling "because the enormous investigative powers wielded by the
grand jury and the relatively limited rights possessed by witnesses and
targets have been tailored exclusively for the purpose of criminal law
enforcement." 273 Now, without any scrutiny, federal prosecutors, on
their own initiative or with prompting from other executive agencies,
will be able to misuse the almost unlimited investigative powers of
grand juries to conduct fishing expeditions into matters totally unrelated
to law enforcement, such as those involving foreign intelligence or
274
immigration.
7.

Immigrants' Rights Curtailed

The Act also deprives immigrants of their due process rights and
First Amendment protections through two statutory mechanisms that
275
work in concert.
First, section 411 greatly enlarges the class of immigrants who are
subject to removal on terrorist grounds as a result of the Act's broad
definitions of "terrorist activities," "engage in terrorist activity," and
"terrorist organization." 276 For example, the Act defines "terrorist
organization" as any "group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not," that engages in "terrorist activity." 277 The Secretary of
State and the Attorney General are given the power to select domestic
groups for designation as "terrorist organizations." 278 Under the Anti-

271 USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 279.

272 Beale & Felman, supranote 269, at 48.
273 Id. at 49.

274 Cf. id. at 49 ("The potential for misuse of the grand jury is especially troubling in view
of the absence of any requirement of judicial approval of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information under the Patriot Act.").
273 Chang, supra note 188, at 4.
276 Id.; USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 34548.
277 USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 348.
278 Id. at 347-48.
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,279 only foreign
groups could be designated as such. 280 In addition, the term "engage in
terrorist activity" has been greatly enlarged to include soliciting funds
for, soliciting membership in, or affording "material support" to a
"terrorist organization." 281 Thus, a noncitizen who gives a donation to a
charity can be found to have "engaged in terrorist activity" even when
that organization serves social and humanitarian ends and the
individual seeks only to further those legitimate ends. 282 Therefore,
section 411 permits guilt to be imposed solely on the basis of political
association protected by the First Amendment:
Before the advent of the Patriot Act, aliens were
deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist
activity. The Patriot Act makes them deportable for
virtually any associational activity with a "terrorist
organization," irrespective of whether the alien's
support has any connection to an act of violence, much
283
less terrorism.
Second, section 412 expands the authority of the Attorney General to
place noncitizens who he "has reasonable grounds to believe" are
involved in terrorist activities in detention during the pendency of
removal proceedings. 284 These noncitizens may be detained up to seven
days without any charges being filed. 285 In addition, immigrants that
have been "certified" by the Attorney General as suspected terrorists
may be subject to indefinite detention by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") "irrespective of any relief from removal
for which the alien may be eligible, or any relief from removal granted
the alien, until the Attorney General determines that the alien is no
longer an alien who may be certified." 286 These procedures ignore the
salient fact that the "Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within

279
280
21
282

Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1248-49 (1996).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A) (2000).
USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 346-47.
See Cole, supra note 232, at 11-12; Lash, supra note 249, at 16; Chang, supra note 188,

at4.
283
284
28

286

Cole, supra note 232, at 11.
USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), 115 Stat. at 350-52; see Chang, supra note 188, at 5.
USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), 115 Stat. at 351.
Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 8

610

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 37

the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful,
287
unlawful, temporary, or permanent."
Following the September 11th attacks, the government rounded up
1200 immigrants, 2 8 "mostly Muslims from Arab, Middle Eastern or
southern Asian nations, who were held on immigration charges while
authorities tried to determine whether they were terrorists." 289 These
detainees "are being tried in secret proceedings, closed to the public, the
press, or even family members. Immigration judges are instructed not to
list the cases on the docket, and to refuse to confirm or deny that the
cases even exist. Such practices are unprecedented." 290 The DOJ has
since released a letter in which it stated that of the more than 750
291
individuals detained by the INS, over 600 had secret hearings.
The government's efforts to conduct such clandestine proceedings
have not, however, met with a favorable reception from the courts. On
August 3, 2002, a federal district judge ordered the DOJ to release the
names of its September 11th detainees pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act.292 The court found that disclosure of the identity of the
detainees or their attorneys did not fall within the scope of exemption
7(A), such that it could "interfere with enforcement proceedings." 293 In
addition, in late August 2002, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the government could not hold secret deportation hearings for a
man alleged to have terrorist ties.294 In its opinion, the court wrote that
"[a] government operating in the shadow of secrecy stands in complete
opposition to the society envisioned by the framers of our
295
Constitution."

287 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is
not confined to the protection of citizens.").
28
See Tamara Audi, U.S. Detained600for Secret Hearings,CHI. TRIB., July 19, 2002, at 13.
289 Wayne Parry, Many Held, Few Charged in Terror Roundup, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 27,
2002, at 3.
290 Cole, supra note 232, at 12.
291 See Audi, supra note 288.

292 FOIA Compels Government to Disclose Names of Detainees in Terrorist Investigation, 71
BNA CRIM. L. REP. 570, 570-71 (Aug. 14, 2002).
293 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000).
294 See Adam Liptak, In Tense Times, a Court Insists on Open Doors, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Sept. 3, 2002, at 2; Parry, supra note 289.
295

Parry, supra note 289.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss2/8

Becker: "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . ": Assessing the Aftermath of

20031

Mirror,Mirror on the Wall

As expressed above, the USA PATRIOT Act may in fact be just the
opposite. The Act defies the spirit of our forefathers and hinders the
cherished values that are the backbone of this great nation. In the recent
words of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "we're likely to
experience more restrictions on personal freedom than has ever been the
case in this country."296
G. The Anti-Terrorism Objective and Domestic Civil Rights Issues
The war on terrorism netted the Pentagon's budget an extra fifty
billion dollars which, being essentially an intelligence and law
297
enforcement activity, is hardly relevant to the war on terrorism.
Congress, whose business since September 11th is essentially terrorism
(over 80% of all legislation in Congress has been related to that subject),
lacked the moral courage to oppose the allocation of such resources for
the development and production of sophisticated weapon systems.
The mirror that reflected the best in America also reflected an
incipient anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudice 298 and an encroachment
on human values and civil rights, all in the name of patriotism.299 In a
climate of fear in which existence has become uncertain and clouded by
the prospect of further acts of terror-violence, there have been lapses into
racial prejudice. 300 That this can occur in such a large country can be
expected, but what cannot be accepted is government-sponsored

2%

Linda Greenhouse, A Nation Challenged: The Supreme Court; In New York Visit,

O'ConnorForesees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
297 See US Senate Passes 393-Billion Dollar Defense Bill, PEOPLE'S DAILY, June 28, 2002,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/28/eng20020628_98711.shtml (last visited Mar.
10, 2003) (noting that the bill provides for fifty billion dollar increase in defense spending
over that authorized for 2002).
298 See Julia Lieblich, Lack of Trust Tears at Muslims: Fallout from Terrorist Attacks Leaves
Many in the U.S. Questioning Their Place in a Country They Have Embraced, CHI.TRIB., Sept. 13,
2002, at 1; see also Eric Schmitt, U.S. Seeks to Fingerprint Visa Holders: Civil Groups Outraged,
CHI.DAILY L. BULL., June 6, 2002, at 2.
299 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Beware Patriotism lhen It Seeks to Take Away Rights, CH1. TRIB.,
Dec. 30, 2001, at 3.
300 See William J. Haddad, When the Innocent are Made Victim, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 27,
2002, at 22.
Immediately after the tragedy there emerged a backlash of hate crimes
against Arabs and Muslims in the United-States. The national media
reported stories of murder, armed assaults and batteries (using guns,
knives, pepper spray, cars, trucks, and rifles). There were also arsons
and firebombings, and even vehicular driving attacks, targeting
schools, mosques, and churches.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 8

612

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol.37

discrimination, the erosion of our constitutional freedoms, and the
distortion of our rule of law.
The collective political will has been expressed in ways that have
raised the specter of the treatment of Japanese-Americans during World
War 11.301 The FBI and the INS have used official racial profiling in
detaining more than 1200 Muslims, 3 2 few of whom were actually
charged with anything other than immigration violations, which are
common among many immigrant nationalities. 303 This new racially
driven policy, which has deprived the detainees of their constitutional
rights, such as not being arrested without "probable cause," the right to
remain silent, and the right to counsel, is a danger to our system of
3
law. 04

The climate of war has blurred our peacetime freedoms and
broadened the discourse of what may become permissible for the elusive
sake of full security. The FBI has even hinted that such abhorrent
30 5
practices as truth serums and moderate forms of physical pressure
30 6
should be allowed against those only suspected as material witnesses
and who invoke their constitutional rights to remain silent. Invading the

301 Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the Japanese
American Internment, 17 CRIM. JUST. 52 (Summer 2002); see Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
302 See David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common Sense" in the Fight Against
Terrorism?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 36, 40-41 (Summer 2002); Kim Barker, Federal Tactics Criticized in
Roundup of 1,100: FBI Defends Detention Policy, But Some Courts Aren't Convinced, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 11, 2002, at 16; Cam Simpson, Roundup Unnerves Oklahoma Muslims; Norman Detainees
Tell of Ordeals; No Terror Charges Filed, id.., Apr. 21, 2002, at 1.
303 Barker, supranote 302 ("Generally, those detained had overstayed their visas, the kind
of immigration law violation commonly overlooked.").
3' See Haddad, supra note 300.
305 Kevin Johnson & Richard Willing, Ex-CIA Chief Revitalizes 'Truth Serum' Debate, USA
TODAY, Apr. 26, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/04/26/torture.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
306 It should be noted that the government's policy of detaining material witnesses for
grand jury investigations has recently been ruled unconstitutional. See Larry Neumeister,
Judge Hits Jailingof 9/11 Witness: Rules that Policy is Unconstitutional;Ashcroft Defends It, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, May 1, 2002, at 32; Benjamin Weiser, Judge Rules Against U.S. on MaterialWitness Law, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 1, 2002, at 1. But see Federal Material Witness Statute
Applies to Grand Jury Proceedings, 71 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 511 (July 24, 2002) (describing
opinion upholding government's right to utilize 18 U.S.C. § 3144 to detain witness for
grand jury investigation).
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privacy of the right to counsel, the DOJ has also been listening in on the
30 7
conversations of lawyers with clients in federal custody.
These new measures also demonstrate how much further diversity
remains to be accommodated in American society. Federal agencies,
including the CIA, FBI, and INS, have few among their ranks who know
firsthand, or understand well, Arab and Muslim culture, including the
Arabic language. Recent recruits who responded to the FBI's web site
are so marginally skilled that they are likely to be more of a hindrance
than helpful.3 8 The result of this current crisis has made matters worse
for those affected: it has increased suspicion; prolonged detentions of
suspects; and caused an inordinate number of investigative hours spent
on dead-ends by our over-burdened law enforcement officers.
If the same mind set and approach used by the CIA, FBI, and INS
continue, we are condemned to make the same mistakes that led to
September 11th. Massive dragnets are no alternative to a better cultural
understanding of the risks we face. That is why these agencies failed to
anticipate what happened, and, to-date, they have failed to uncover the
planners and support network in the United States for the September
11th attacks.
As detailed above, the USA PATRIOT Act contains numerous
violations of constitutional standards, 3 9 and President Bush's Order
establishing special military commissions permits evidence to be kept
secret and procedural rights to be abridged. 310 Military commissions are
valid for war crimes abroad 311 but are not an acceptable alternative
under our system of justice for persons in the United States to whom the
Constitution applies. This is precisely what we steadfastly threw in the
face of the U.S.S.R., China, and other regimes we deemed undemocratic.

3w See Paul R. Rice & Benjamin Parlin Saul, Is the War on Terrorism a War on AttorneyClient Privilege?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 22 (Summer 2002); Deborah L. Rhode, Terrorists and Their
Lawyers, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 16, 2002, at 5 (noting that, in connection with the
indictment of defense attorney Lynne Stewart, "a Justice Department surveillance directive,
being applied for the first time in this case, gives the government unchecked power to
eavesdrop on confidential conversations between lawyers and any clients suspected of
terrorism -without prior judicial authorization or statutory basis").
308 See J.M. Lawrence, FBI on a Mission to Hire Hundreds of New Agents, BOSTON HERALD,
Apr. 1, 2002, at 14.
309 See supra Part I.F.
310

See supra Part II.E.

311 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism:
Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 100-01 (2002).
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Had any other country announced this, we would have roundly
denounced it.
Our valued civil rights are fast becoming a self-inflicted casualty of
efforts to prevent terrorism, even though this will not enhance our
security. 312 Our system of criminal justice, with due process for all, is
fully capable of dealing with all types of criminal violations. 313 If it is a
question of venue, there are federal courts in distant places such as
Alaska and Guam where security can be assured. It will be up to a few
courageous judges to find these measures unconstitutional, informed,
perhaps, by Benjamin Franklin's notion that "[t]hey that can give up
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty
314
nor safety."
Vigilant at home and pursuing enemies abroad, government policy
goes largely unchallenged by the media and society at large. Those who
dare to question or criticize face accusations of justifying evil or "aiding
and abetting the enemy"-an intimidation that is perhaps the greatest
danger to the American covenant of freedom. 315 Our ability to criticize

312 See David Kravets, 9/11 Attacks Prompt Changes in Legal Rights, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Sept. 10, 2002, at 3.
The USA Patriot Act, hurriedly adopted by Congress and signed by
Bush six weeks after the terror attacks, tipped laws in the
government's favor in 350 subject areas involving 40 federal agencies.
The Bush administration has since imposed other legal changes
without congressional consent, such as allowing federal agents to
monitor attorney-client conversations in federal prison, and
encouraging bureaucrats to deny public access to many documents
requested under the Freedom of Information Act.
Id. See also Will Lester, Threatened Public Could Allow Erosion of Civil Liberties, id., May 20,
2002, at 2.
313 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Jurisdiction in "Terrorism" Cases, Address at U.S. Naval War
College, Conference on International Law & the War on Terrorism (June 26-28, 2002) (on
file with author).
314 JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 422 (14th ed. 1968) (quoting
Benjamin Franklin from HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759)).

315 In December 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft told the Senate Judiciary
Committee:
To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against
non-citizens, to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of
lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics only aid terrorists, for they
erode our national unity and diminish our resolve.
They give
ammunition to America's enemies and pause to America's friends.
They encourage people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearingon Anti-Terrorism Policy, 106th Cong. (2001) (testimony of
Attorney General Ashcroft); Lash, supranote 249.
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must never be inhibited or dulled, for it is one of our fundamental
freedoms.
The DOJ's sweeping law enforcement actions against Arabs and
Muslims violated established constitutional protections and the rule of
316
law. Attorney General Ashcroft's disparaging remarks about Islam
just added to the simmering anti-Muslim campaign propagated by
Hollywood as part of its patriotic effort to combat terrorism.
Regrettably, this was urged by Presidential Assistant Karl Rove when he
met in Los Angeles with senior industry leaders. 317 The religious right
political movement is abetting this anti-Muslim campaign with
derogatory public statements by Pat Robertson 318 and evangelist Billy
Graham's son, Franklin Graham.3 9 Conversely, President Bush has
320
made many efforts to counteract this negativism.
The public and the media hardly questioned the domestic policies
that were hastily developed in the aftermath of September 11th. Only a
few opposed the USA PATRIOT Act; fewer spoke out against the
Executive Order establishing Military Commissions, which tribunals
could try even permanent residents of the United States. The 1996 law
that allows "secret evidence" to be used against persons in the United
States, including permanent residents and other lawfully admitted
aliens, is still in effect and few dare oppose it.321 This law is a clear
violation of the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine those
who proffer charges or testimony against another. 322 The DOJ has even
illegally expanded the scope of the "secret evidence" to seize assets of
charitable Muslim organizations. 323 This practice, which was a mainstay

See Salim Muwakkil, Faith-based Violence and Religious Zealotry, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25,
2002, at 17; infra text accompanying note 352.
317 Massing, supra note 14, at 203.
318 See Muwakkil, supra note 316.
319 See Graham'sSon Chides Muslims on 9/11, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2002, at 14.
320 See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
321 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e) (2000).
322 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
323 See Curtis Lawrence, Charity's Rights Not Violated, Judge Says: U.S. Had Cause to Take
Muslim Group's Assets, He Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 12, 2002, at 22 (noting that seizure of
$900,000 in charity's assets was based upon secret evidence, which charity's attorneys were
not permitted to review in charity's suit seeking return of its funds); cf. Ana Mendieta, 45
Protesters Seek Release of Muslim Charity Chief, id., Sept. 18, 2002, at 18 (quoting statement of
Caise Hassan, member of the board of Grenada Muslims and Jews for Human Rights, that
"[tihese are the tactics of a police state, the apartheid in South Africa and the occupied
territories in Israel, and they are not worthy of a democratic system"); Steve Warmbir,
Charity Chief Cleared, ChargedAgain, id., Sept. 14, 2002, at 10.
316
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of every tyrannical regime in history and which the United States has
324
consistently denounced, is now accepted.
To oppose such abuses is viewed as anti-American at a time of
national crisis, and few dared to do so. The President set the tone at
home when he told foreign governments that "either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists." 325 The zero-sum game meant that any
reasonable disagreement with what DOJ is doing, or some of the
Madison Avenue approaches of the White House and Department of
State ("DOS") political spinsters, becomes impossible.
The challenges of terrorism remain, notwithstanding the security
precautions the Administration is rightfully taking,326 even though
airport security appears much more excessive than necessary. Future
threats depend, in part, on assessing what happened and on preventing
what may happen. We still do not know how September 11th happened;
we have no clue as to who planned it, how many on the ground assisted,
who may still be in the United States, if they are noncitizens, or whether
there were also American-born actors.
The assumption that the nineteen persons identified on the five
hijacked planes acted alone in the operation is flawed. Terrorism experts
know that such an operation, though basically low-tech, nevertheless

324 Another mainstay of tyrannical regimes is the use of the military in civilian law
enforcement. In this regard, the Bush Administration has called for a review of the Posse
Comitatus Act on the grounds that "the threat of terrorism may force government planners
to consider using the military for domestic law enforcement, now largely prohibited by
federal law." Scott Lindlaw, Use of Military for Domestic Law Enforcement Study Pending,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 22, 2002, at 2.
The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000), provides that
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1385. The statute's historical strictures, however, have been relaxed in modern
times in order to allow law enforcement officers engaged in the "war on drugs" access to
military and national guard resources and personnel. See 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (allowing
use of information collected during military operations); 32 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (concerning
drug interdiction and counter-drug activities); CAROL MOORE, THE DAVIDIAN MASSACRE 99,
104 (1995) (describing abuses of the posse comitatus law in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms' assault upon the Branch Davidian church in Waco, Texas in 1993).
325 Response Address, supra note 12, at 1349.
326
Cf. Gregg Easterbrook, The All-Too-Friendly Skies: Security as an Afterthought, in How
DID THIS HAPPEN?: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note 11, at 163.
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required more than the nineteen or twenty perpetrators identified so far.
An operation of such scale requires a great deal of support, planning,
and preparation. It necessarily requires a number of persons or teams to
deal with logistics, surveillance, transportation, security evaluation,
avionics expertise, communications, planning and coordination, and
escape for those on the ground. It is also quite rare, if not implausible, to
conclude that the nineteen persons identified on the hijacked planes
were all part of a suicide pact. The likelihood that nineteen persons were
part of a suicide pact is highly improbable. This has never before
occurred. Thus, maybe only one person on each plane knew of the
suicide mission.
It is convenient to reassure the American public that all nineteen of
the perpetrators were foreigners and died in the crashes. This leaves no
loose ends, even if intelligence and law enforcement experts know that to
be unlikely. The DOJ resorted to that approach in the Oklahoma City
bombing by conveying the impression that Timothy McVeigh acted
alone, though this may not be not the case. 327 The same approach, the
single-killer theory, was taken in connection with the assassination of
President Kennedy. The danger with that type of distorted reassurance
is that it lulls the public into a false sense of security, and the
consequences of future preparedness can be harmful.
H. The Intelligence Failure
There was some minimal congressional inquiry into the CIA and FBI
failures. 328 But it did not address the cultural tunnel-vision of those
organizations when it comes to matters concerning Muslim and Arab
cultures. Suffice it to recall how the FBI was scrambling after September
11th to find Arabic interpreters. 329 Neither the FBI nor CIA have
anything more than a few token consultants whose background and
expertise can help the security of the United States. Americans of
Muslim and Arab origin do not figure among presidential appointees,

See GORE VIDAL, PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE: How WE GOT TO BE So
RATED 47 (2002) (concluding that Timothy McVeigh did not act alone).
328 See Ken Guggenheim, Intelligence Panels Invite Spouses of 2 Victims: 9/11 Inquiry Sets 1st
Public Hearing, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2002, at 14; Ken Guggenheim, U.S. Missed Many Clues of
Sept. 11: Overseas Plane Plot Reported Month Earlier, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at 24
("Intelligence agencies failed to anticipate terrorists flying planes into buildings despite a
dozen clues that Osama bin Laden or others might do it, a congressional investigator said
cf. Dan
.); Eggen & Bill Miller, Bush Was Told of PotentialHijacking, WASH. POST, May 16,
2002, at 1.
329 See Lawrence, supra note 308.
327
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nor are they among the high-level experts consulted by the White House,
DOD, DOJ, or CIA. Worse yet, there are few agents in the field from
these societies. Thus, most of the information available is what can be
bought outside the United States and that is always of questionable
value. The CIA can rely on some cooperation from counterpart agencies
in the Arab world and elsewhere, but there is no substitute for our own
expert analysts who are born to these cultures.
The CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies believe that al-Qa' da is
an organization but are unable to understand the organization table. The
known models of the mafia and other organized crime groups are not
applicable in the case of al-Qa' da,330 neither is the structure of
communist cells. The models employed by organizations, such as the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, is more relevant. 331 But al-Qa'da combines the
features of a movement and several organizational models.
The
movement model makes it difficult to assess how a worldwide
movement can evolve in different countries. In each country where the
movement exists, it can affiliate with different local organizations and
develop structures that differ from those in other countries.
I.

The War Against TerrorGoes On

The two main targets of the war, Osama bin Laden and Mullah
Omar, whose captures were originally presented to us as paramount
goals of the war, have not been reached and have become
inconsequential. 332 The President's "dead or alive" pronouncement of
the two men is still in effect, 333 but in the meantime, it appears that they
are organizing a guerilla war in Afghanistan and more terrorist attacks
against U.S. targets whether at home or abroad. The war we won is still
334
ongoing.

330 See Brian M. Jenkins, The OrganizationMen: Anatomy of a TerroristAttack, in How DID
THIS HAPPEN?: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note 11, at 1, 12.

331 Cf.M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Face of Terror: Nations Have Struggled with Extremism, Even
as They Employed It, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2001, § 2, at 1.
332 Liz Sly, Bin Laden, Dead or Alive, Eludes U.S. Searchers, id., Sept. 11, 2002, at 4; Sly, supra
note 16.
33 See Remarks by the President to Employees at the Pentagon and an Exchange with
Reporters in Arlington, Virginia, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1324, 1327 (Sept. 17, 2001)
(containing President Bush's "dead or alive" announcement).
334 See Peter Baker, GIs Battle 'Ghosts' in Afghanistan: Search for Elusive Enemy Frustrates
Americans, WASH. POST, May 16, 2002, at Al.
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The guerilla warfare in Afghanistan is likely to increase, and it may
also sting beyond what we may be able to absorb. The Taliban and alQa' da guerillas, though limited in numbers, benefit from Pakistani and
335
some Afghani popular support, and that is important to their efforts.
Future attacks by the Taliban are likely to also be directed against
U.N. forces and personnel in Afghanistan and against officials of that
interim government. 336 What the results will be on the international
community to help Afghanistan remains to be seen. Intertribal conflict is
also likely to rekindle, making the task of rebuilding the country more
difficult and the U.S. mission there more complicated. 337 To date, the
assistance and support we publicly announced to help rebuild
Afghanistan have not been forthcoming.
President Bush's prediction that it is going to be a long war is
correct. 338 Whether we will have the staying power and the patience to
deal with it for as long as it takes remains to be seen. Our political
culture has evidenced in the past a deficit in these qualities. Above all,
that culture also revealed our predilection for use of force to settle
problems that require other means, particularly when it comes to nation339
building.
J.

Diversions

Since the "crusade" against evil directed against the al-Qa' da and
Taliban in Afghanistan 340 was successfully completed according to the
impression created by the White House and DOS spinsters, a new
crusade was developed. The Administration's new campaign against the

335 See Rajan Menon, The Restless Region: The Brittle States of Central and South Asia, in
How DID THIS HAPPEN?: TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note 11, at 97,101-02.

336 See Liz Sly, Karzai Assassin Fails: Attempt on President's Life, Fatal Explosion Jolt
Afghanistan, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 2002, at 1.
337 See The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward?, AFGHANISTAN BRIEFING 3-4 (Int'l Crisis
Group, Kabal/Brussels, May 16, 2002) (describing unstable situation between tribes).
338 See supranote 12.
339 See Michael Ignatieff, Nation Building Lite, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 28, 2002, at 26; see also
Joel Rogers, The End of Innocence, in A JUST RESPONSE: THE NATION ON TERRORISM,
DEMOCRACY, AND SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, supra note 4, at 101, 103 (describing the
"unauthorized uses of force" employed by the United States).
M4 See Ford, supra note 3.
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"axis of evil," namely Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, 341 is at best a
diversion.
The first two of these countries are Muslim countries, although
nothing logically connects them. Iran has proven in the last few years to
be a fairly responsible participant in international affairs. 342 The fact that
it is developing its conventional military capabilities is no more alarming
than what several other countries are doing. As to North Korea's
development of missile and nuclear technology, it is a genuine concern
that has to be dealt with but not by linking it to Iran and Iraq. Iraq, on
the other hand, has been our albatross since the first Bush
Administration, and we never had an effective policy to deal with
Saddam Hussein's regime. Linking these three unrelated countries in an
all-encompassing moral sweep has hardly convinced any of our NATO
Allies, and for that matter, any other government.
The "axis of evil" pronouncement is not a policy but a public
relations diversion. It may strike a responsive chord at home, but abroad
it evokes the specter of further U.S. unilateral military action, which most
see as a threat to peace and stability.
K.

External Reactions

The sympathies of 1.3 billion Muslims have not been in our
direction, rather they have swung decisively against us. 343 An Egyptian
pop-philosophy story goes like this: A man sees another on his hands
and knees under a streetlight at night seemingly searching for
something. "What are you looking for?" "My watch, I lost it over there,"
pointing to the unlit side of the street. "Then, why are you looking
here?" "Because here I can see." In the United States, understanding the
culture, religion, and reactions of Arabs and Muslims, and they are
different, is done under Washington's lamplight where all concerned can
see what they want. That it has little to do with what is going on in that
unlit part of the world blissfully escapes these observers. 344 It is not
341 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 133, 135 (Jan. 29, 2002) (naming Iran, Iraq, and North Korea).
342 See, e.g., H. Josef Herbert, Iran Turns Over Al-Qaida Suspects, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 12,
2002, at 21.
343 See Tom Hundley, Muslim Anger Toward U.S. Intensifies in Post-9/11 Era, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 13, 2002, at 16; R.C. Longworth, In Many Nations, Sympathy Has Turned Into Hostility:
Post-9/11 Policies Eroding Goodwill, id., Sept. 12, 2002, at 8.
344 See Longworth, supra note 343 ("Many Arabs and other Muslims, like Third World
residents of Latin America and Africa, honor the American victims of terror but insist that
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because this country lacks experts on these cultures and societies, but
because these views, if different from Washington's wisdom, are not
wanted.
The foreign policy establishment, political spinsters, and the media
have their way of seeing and doing things. Their list of Washington and
New York sages on Islam and Arab affairs seldom includes experts from
such ethnic backgrounds. Even congressional hearings draw on that
same list. Their explanations are always the same: Arabs and Muslims
are violent, intolerant, ignorant, anti-Western, against modernity, and
anti-Jewish. Nothing is said about the reasons: U.S. double standards,
the plight of these societies at the hands of corrupt and undemocratic
regimes supported by the United States, and the injustice suffered by the
345
Palestinians with the U.S.' unflinching support of Israel.
The Administration has a public relations setup in the White House
with the DOS and the DOD to sell its policies to Arab and Muslim
peoples all over the world. 34 6 The White House/DOS effort is headed by
Charlotte Beers, a former Chicago advertising executive, now an UnderSecretary of State.347 She is approaching these different worlds with
Madison Avenue techniques. Paid ads on al-Jazeera TV were at one time
contemplated; now there is a special radio broadcast which few in that
part of the world are likely to be influenced by.348
Recently
Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House Committee on

the Sept. 11 attacks were payback for the damage that U.S. government policies have done
to their countries.").
[Ain overwhelming majority of Muslims worldwide do not believe the
attacks were orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, or by Arabs or
Muslims. Many believe instead that either the United States or Israel
was responsible in an elaborate effort to further demonize the Arab
World.
What has soured many Muslims on the U.S. over the past year is
the way the Bush administration has realigned American foreign
policy in a manner that appears deliberately to scapegoat Muslims. In
such a view, allowing Israel to define its dispute with the Palestinians
as a war on terrorism is the most notable example, but hardly the only
one.
Hundley, supra note 343.
35
See ISMAIL ZAYID, PALESTINE: A STOLEN HERITAGE (1974); M. Cherif Bassiouni, As the
Middle East Goes Up in Flames: Israel's Territorial Expansion Is Presented as an Acceptable
Matter of Fact and Not as Illegal Under InternationalLaw, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 2001, at 21.
36
See Hedges, supra note 14.
347 Massing, supra note 14, at 203; Hedges, supra note 14.
3
David Hoffman, Beyond Public Diplomacy, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 83, 85 (Mar./Apr. 2002).
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International Relations, had hearings on why the United States cannot
sell its policies to the Muslim and Arab masses. 349 Had he called
knowledgeable experts from that background, he would have known.
Here's what they would have said on how things are viewed on the unlit
side of the street "that is over there" about America's double standards:

349

*

Islamic fundamentalism is portrayed as violent and "evil,"
but Jewish and Christian fundamentalism is virtuous
orthodoxy.

*

"Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your
son to die for him. Christianity is a faith in which God sends
350
his son to die for you."

*

The plight of Arab and Muslim masses is caused by Islam
and not by the poverty, ignorance, and despair due to the
types of regimes supported by the United States.

*

Islamic charities in the United States that support schools,
orphanages, and hospitals in Palestine fund "terrorism" and
their assets frozen and seized, 351 while Jewish funding of
settlers in Israel who seize Palestinians' land and engage in
violence against those who oppose them 352 is given tax
deductions.

*

Teaching Palestinian children that their land was taken by
foreign settlers is teaching hatred, while teaching Israeli
children that Palestine belongs to the Jewish people is
laudable.

*

Supporting "moderate" Arab governments is in the interest
of the United States, while opposing their undemocratic
practices, corruption, and human rights violations is not.

"

Justifying the death of an estimated half-a-million Iraqi
children resulting from U.S.-sponsored sanctions as the

Id.at 84.

350 Muwakkil, supra note 316 (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft).

See Lawrence, supra note 323; Mike Robinson, Islamic Charity's Lawsuit Put on Hold
Until Question of Terrorism Support is Cleared, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 14, 2002, at 3.
352
Bassiouni, supra note 345.
351

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss2/8

Becker: "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . ": Assessing the Aftermath of

20031

Mirror,Mirroron the Wall

623

responsibility of the Iraqi regime, 3 3 while condemning all
killings by Arabs.
*

The media is quick to report the injury of 100 Israelis, while
you will hardly see anywhere the mention of about 11,000
354
Palestinians injured.

*

When an Israeli child is killed, it is headline news, a frontpage story, and public opinion is shocked. On the other
hand, when a Palestinian child is killed it goes as an inside
story and is recounted as if it were a traffic incident.355

*

The killing of innocent Israelis by suicide bombers is
abhorrent terrorism, but the killing of innocent Palestinians
by F-16s, Apache helicopter gun ships, M-4 tanks, and
artillery and infantry ordinance, even when clearly
disproportionate or apparently unjustified, seldom raises
356
concerns.

*

Forcibly removing Taliban combatants from Afghanistan to
a U.S. military base in Cuba and denying them POW status
is not a violation of the Geneva Conventions 357 but, if done
to our soldiers by any other power, it would be a war crime.

These are only a few examples of how things are viewed differently
"over there" other than under the Potomac limelight. The thing to do is
to eliminate double standards and to train some light on the other side of

353 See National Mobilization

to End the Sanctions Against Iraq, at http://www.
8thdaycenter.org/062600.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
On August 6, 1990 the UN Security Council, under pressure from the
US, imposed a near total embargo on Iraq, the most comprehensive
sanctions in the history of the United Nations. To date, these sanctions
have taken the lives of over one million persons, 500,000 of whom
were children under the age of five, in a population of just 22 million
person[s]. The death toll continues to climb according to UN reports.
Sanctions are a more deadly weapon of mass destruction than the
atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.
Id.
354 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Rights Should Not EvaporateAmid Conflict, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2001,
§ 2, at 1.
35
Bassiouni, supra note 345.
356 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Arab and Muslims on the Middle East Conflict is Not Inevitable, Nor is
Peace Impossible, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2001, at 31.
357 See supra Part II.D (discussing the treatment of POWs).
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the street for answers. When that is recognized and things change, the
United States, which is still admired, will also be respected.
L.

Retrenchment

Since the Administration basically declared victory on all fronts-a
dangerous overstatement by the White House and DOS spinsters-it did
not turn its attention to the causes of terrorism, which are in large part
the result of despair and bitterness. Obviously, this requires long-term
policies. But the Administration's policies in the countries from which so
many terrorists come remain unchanged: support for the same regimes,
no effective efforts to push for the establishment of democracy and the
rule of law, and a failure to insist on the enforcement of human rights.
But to its credit, the Administration's Country Report on Human Rights
released in March 2002 identifies many of these countries' failings. 358
There is also no change in U.S. policies committing this administration to
bringing peace between Israelis and Palestinians through engaged
involvement. The latter have suffered most of the consequences of the
reciprocal violence through U.S.-supplied F-16s, Apache helicopters,
gun-ships, and other military and financial support. The Administration
has failed to uphold U.S. law that prohibits Israel from using such
weapons to repress civilians 359-not even a protest has been lodged.
III. CONCLUSION
The best that can be said about the Afghan war, notwithstanding the
bravery of our troops and those of our allies, is that we vanquished
without much danger and triumphed without much glory.
If this was a war to win the hearts and minds of the 1.3 billion
Muslims, it has been a total failure. What has come out is a callous,
arrogant, and insensitive image of America-and that feeds the claims of
terrorists. Though President Bush and his Administration have made
laudable efforts to convey to the Muslim world that they are not at war
with Islam, the message is still weak and without much credibility. The
Administration should do more to bring its message to the people of
Muslim states and back it with tangible action abroad and at home. One

358 The Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
359 See 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (2000) ("Defense articles and defense services shall be sold or
leased by the United States Government under this chapter to friendly countries solely for
internal security, for legitimate self-defense ....
")(emphasis added).
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of the first steps toward solving the war on terrorism and gaining the
trust of Muslims would be to promote and push for peace in the Middle
East. Peace can be achieved if the same rules could be applied to each
side. The first step towards peace is human reconciliation, which occurs
when both sides demonstrate respect for the lives and well being of
others. The establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and
Gaza with some territorial adjustments, as was discussed in Camp David
in July 2000, is feasible but not with all the security limitations on
Palestinian sovereignty that the plan contained.
As to our victory over the Taliban, it did not enhance our moral
standing with most governments nor with world public opinion.
Besides, it is not over yet. Terrorism is not analogous to war because it is
essentially a crime, and crimes are best dealt with through law
enforcement. The response to terrorism is the pursuit of justice,
relentless and unyielding. Our response should be guided by the fact
that we are dealing with individuals who are relatively few in number,
belonging to one or more organizations, possibly present or active in
several countries with a wider support base in still other countries, and
with the financial resources to carry out their criminal activity.
Terrorism, like drug trafficking and organized crime, is a worldwide
phenomenon; globalization makes it even more so. A country, no matter
how powerful, cannot by itself fight a few small criminal organizations
scattered all over the world.
What is needed is strengthened
international cooperation to facilitate extradition, obtaining criminal
evidence abroad, and freezing and seizing assets used to finance
transnational criminal activities. We need to develop multiple strategies
as we reassess intelligence gathering and sharing in the United States,
security measures at airports, other law-enforcement issues, and the new
role of the military in combating terrorism.
The American people have lost the innocence attached to our way of
life. If terrorists manage to cause this society to curtail its constitutional
liberties or to become divided, they will have succeeded in their ultimate
goal. Will the American people be satisfied with the pursuit of justice,
which can only come through legal means, or will they want revenge,
which has thus far motivated the Administration's resort to extra-legal
practices?
We have proved to be a mighty nation, but a nation is only great
when it acts on the basis of high moral principles by consistently doing
what is right.
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Yet, the most immediate question to be addressed is whether the
federal government has seized upon the tragic events of September 11th
as a pretext to expand its powers by surreptitiously taking away our civil
liberties under the guise of the "war on terrorism." In order to soberly
answer this disturbing question, however, we need to stop admiring
ourselves in front of the mirror; lest, when we turn around from our
present state of patriotic narcissism, our freedoms are all gone, snatched
360
away like a thief in the night.

See 1 Thessalonians5:3-6.
3 For when they shall say, Peace and safety; then sudden
destruction cometh upon them, as travail upon a woman with child;
and they shall not escape.
4 But ye, brethren, are not in darkness that that day should
overtake you as a thief.
5 Ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day: we
are not of the night, nor of darkness.
6 Therefore let us not sleep, as do others; but let us watch and be
sober.
Id.; cf. 1 Thessalonians5:2.
3o

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss2/8

